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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we take a systematic look at global 
imbalances. First, we provide a deﬁ  nition  of 
the phenomenon, and relate global imbalances 
to widening external positions of systemically 
important economies that reﬂ  ect distortions or 
entail risks for the global economy. Second, 
we provide an operational content to this 
deﬁ   nition by measuring trends in external 
imbalances over the past decade and putting 
these in a historical perspective. We argue 
that three main features set today’s situation 
apart from past episodes of growing external 
imbalances: (i) the emergence of new players, 
in particular emerging market economies such 
as China and India, which are quickly catching 
up with the advanced economies; (ii) an 
unprecedented wave of ﬁ  nancial globalisation, 
with more integrated global ﬁ  nancial markets 
and increasing opportunities for international 
portfolio diversiﬁ   cation, also characterised by 
considerable asymmetries in the level of market 
completeness across countries; and (iii) the 
favourable global macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
environment, with record high global growth 
rates in recent years, low ﬁ  nancial  market 
volatility and easy global ﬁ  nancing conditions 
over a long time period of time, running at least 
until the summer of 2007. Finally, we provide an 
analytical overview of the fundamental causes 
and drivers of global imbalances. The central 
argument is that the increase in imbalances 
has been driven by a unique combination of 
structural and cyclical determinants.
Key words: global imbalances, current account, 
incomplete  ﬁ   nancial globalisation, structural 
factors, cyclical factors. 
JEL: F2, F32, F33, F41.5
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Global imbalances have been a key issue in 
international policy discussions over recent 
years. Since the International Monetary Fund/
World Bank annual meetings in Dubai in 
September 2003, the IMF and the G7 have 
repeatedly pointed to risks from the imbalances 
and have designed a policy strategy to facilitate 
a smooth unwinding. 
More recently, in the course of 2007, concerns 
over global imbalances have been partly 
attenuated, as the current account imbalance of 
the main deﬁ  cit country, the United States, has 
started to correct, partly in response to the 
turmoil in the sub-prime mortgage market. 
Nevertheless, the size of these imbalances 
remains large, and a further widening of external 
positions can be observed across a range of 
countries, including in the main surplus country, 
China. The imbalances therefore remain a 
central item at policy meetings.
The understanding of global imbalances has 
evolved over recent years. Initial analysis and 
discussions centred on the current account deﬁ  cit 
of the United States. Attention then broadened 
to include developments in the main surplus 
countries, ﬁ  rst and foremost Asian economies 
and oil-exporting countries. Also, the focus on 
current account positions was complemented by 
a focus on the domestic and ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
in the economies concerned. 
Despite considerable advances in the analytical 
understanding of global imbalances, several 
questions remain open. Opinions are still split 
over whether, when and how these imbalances 
will adjust. It is unclear how long they can be 
sustained. It is unclear whether their adjustment 
will be orderly and gradual or instead be coupled 
with macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial instability. 
With so many open questions, this paper 
aims to take a more systematic look at global 
imbalances. It ﬁ  rst offers a deﬁ  nition of global 
imbalances and puts them into perspective. We 
deﬁ  ne global imbalances as “external positions 
of systemically important economies that 
reﬂ  ect distortions or entail risks for the global 
economy”. The deﬁ  nition has three components. 
It refers to external positions, encompassing 
current account positions as well as ﬁ  nancial 
positions; it refers to systemically important 
economies, including both the deﬁ  cit  side 
(e.g. the United States) and the surplus side 
(e.g. Asia, oil exporters); and it refers to 
distortions and risks, so as to distinguish 
imbalanced from balanced positions. Distortions 
can be deﬁ  ned as deviations from the ﬂ  exible 
price/perfect competition world; they can be 
induced by policy choices or private sector 
decisions. Risks refer to the macroeconomic 
and ﬁ  nancial implications, both under a scenario 
of unwinding (risk of disorderly unfolding, 
as manifested for instance in the ﬁ  nancial 
market turmoil of summer 2007) and under a 
scenario of further increasing imbalances (risk 
of a protectionist backlash, as manifested for 
instance in the limited progress made under the 
Doha round of trade negotiations).
The paper then provides an operational content 
to this deﬁ  nition by measuring trends in external 
imbalances over the past decade and putting 
these in a historical perspective. Current account 
indicators point to widening external positions 
since the mid-1990s, with an acceleration in 
the most recent years. The absolute value of 
current account positions as a percentage of 
global GDP has doubled since the mid-1990s. 
Global deﬁ   cits are increasingly concentrated 
in a single country, the United States, which 
now absorbs around 75% of world net savings. 
Current account balances have also become 
highly persistent, with only a few large countries 
switching between deﬁ  cit and surplus positions 
over the past ten years.
Gross international ﬁ   nancial positions have 
built up even more rapidly than current account 
positions. The evolution of net foreign asset 
positions largely mirrors that of current account 
positions, with some differences due to valuation 
effects (in particular for the United States). 
Gross asset positions, however, have increased 
at a much faster pace, reﬂ  ecting  intensifying 6
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global ﬁ  nancial integration. Although emerging 
market economies in aggregate do not account 
for a substantial share of total gross foreign 
assets, they account for a very large share of the 
build-up in international reserve assets.
Potential distortions and risks have increased 
in tandem with the widening external positions. 
There is indeed ample evidence that the current 
pattern of global imbalances is not entirely the 
result of freely operating market forces, but 
also of policy interventions (large, persistent 
and unidirectional interventions in foreign 
exchange markets; persistent deviations of 
ﬁ  scal policy from long-run equilibria; lack of 
ﬂ  exible labour, product and ﬁ  nancial markets). 
Risks relate mainly to a scenario of unwinding 
imbalances (potential macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial disruption) but are relevant also under 
a scenario of continuously high imbalances 
(potential increase in protectionist pressures).
We argue that three main features set today’s 
situation apart from past episodes of growing 
external imbalances: (i) the emergence of new 
players, in particular emerging market economies 
such as China and India, which are quickly 
catching up with the advanced economies; (ii) an 
unprecedented wave of ﬁ  nancial globalisation, 
with more integrated global ﬁ  nancial markets 
and increasing opportunities for international 
portfolio diversiﬁ   cation, also characterised by 
considerable asymmetries in the level of market 
completeness across countries; and (iii) the 
favourable global macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
environment, with record high global growth 
rates in recent years, low ﬁ  nancial  market 
volatility and easy global ﬁ  nancing conditions 
over a long time period of time, running at least 
until the summer of 2007.  
Finally, the paper provides an analytical 
overview of the fundamental causes and drivers 
of global imbalances. The central argument is 
that the increase in imbalances has been driven 
by a unique combination of structural and 
cyclical determinants. Structural changes in 
the global economy have allowed a widening 
of external positions that may be sustainable 
in the medium term. These structural changes 
have been supplemented by cyclical or policy-
induced factors that highlight short-run risks 
and create the possibility of a sudden, disorderly 
unwinding of global imbalances.
The structural determinants of global imbalances 
relate mainly to the incomplete process of 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation, which is linked to 
the lower stage of ﬁ   nancial development in 
some regions of the world. Financial market 
imperfections in fast-growing emerging 
economies combined with the rapid process of 
ﬁ  nancial globalisation has had an impact on the 
magnitude and the direction of capital ﬂ  ows 
at the global level, with capital ﬂ  owing from 
emerging to industrial economies. The effects of 
ﬁ  nancial market imperfections on capital ﬂ  ows 
are further ampliﬁ  ed by the differential impact 
of business cycle moderation and by the speciﬁ  c 
ability of the US ﬁ   nancial markets to insure 
households against idiosyncratic risks. The 
equilibrium generated by these structural factors 
cannot last forever but is sustainable in the short 
and medium term.
Cyclical factors have further fuelled this 
structural process of widening external 
positions. These factors relate to saving/
investment patterns in the private sector (in the 
United States, for instance, accelerating private 
consumption due to a productivity-induced 
increase in US permanent income and due to 
wealth effects from rapid asset price increases) 
and the public sector (“twin” deﬁ   cits in the 
United States). If market participants start to 
question the sustainability of these patterns, 
an overshooting can happen and a disorderly 
unwinding of global economic imbalances is 
possible.
The framework provided in this paper, based 
on a clear distinction being drawn between 
structural and cyclical drivers, can therefore 
provide a concrete operational tool for policy-
makers to monitor developments in global 
imbalances. 7
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1   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION  1
Global imbalances have been a key issue in 
international policy discussions over recent 
years. Since the International Monetary Fund/
World Bank annual meetings in Dubai in 
September 2003, the IMF and the G7 have 
repeatedly pointed to risks from the imbalances 
and have designed a policy strategy to facilitate 
a smooth unwinding. When the IMF designed 
its multilateral consultation process as a 
new global surveillance tool in 2006, global 
imbalances were selected as the ﬁ  rst topic to be 
addressed, resulting in a detailed policy agenda 
for the major economies. The President of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) has mentioned 
these risks in his introductory statement to each 
of the Bank’s monthly press conferences since 
November 2003, and they have been discussed 
in various issues of the ECB’s Financial Stability 
Review. 
More recently, in the course of 2007, concerns 
over global imbalances have been partly 
attenuated, as the current account imbalance of 
the main deﬁ  cit country, the United States, has 
started to correct in response to the turmoil in 
the sub-prime mortgage market. Nevertheless, 
the size of these imbalances remains large, 
and a further widening of external positions 
can be observed across a range of countries, 
including in the main surplus country, China. 
The imbalances therefore remain a central item 
at policy meetings.
The understanding of global imbalances has 
evolved over recent years. Initial analysis and 
discussions centred on the current account deﬁ  cit 
of the United States. Attention then broadened 
to include developments in the main surplus 
countries, ﬁ  rst and foremost Asian economies 
and oil-exporting countries. Also, the focus on 
current account positions was complemented by 
a focus on the domestic and ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
in the economies concerned. 
Despite considerable advances in the analytical 
understanding of global imbalances, several 
questions remain open. Opinions are still split 
over whether, when and how these imbalances 
will adjust. It is unclear how long they can be 
sustained. It is unclear whether their adjustment 
will be orderly and gradual or instead be coupled 
with macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial  instability. 
More broadly, the imbalances ﬁ  gure prominently 
in political and societal debates over job losses, 
outsourcing, currency manipulation and possible 
protectionist measures.
With so many open questions, this paper 
aims to take a more systematic look at global 
imbalances. It ﬁ  rst offers a deﬁ  nition of global 
imbalances and puts them into perspective 
(Section 2). We deﬁ   ne global imbalances as 
“external positions of systemically important 
economies that reﬂ  ect distortions or entail risks 
for the global economy”. The deﬁ  nition  has 
three components. It refers to external positions, 
encompassing current account positions as well 
as ﬁ  nancial positions; it refers to systemically 
important economies, including both the deﬁ  cit 
side (e.g. the United States) and the surplus 
side (e.g. Asia, oil exporters); and it refers 
to  distortions and risks, so as to distinguish 
imbalanced from balanced positions. Distortions 
can be deﬁ  ned as deviations from the ﬂ  exible 
price/perfect competition world; they can be 
induced by policy choices or private sector 
decisions. Risks refer to the macroeconomic 
and ﬁ  nancial implications, both under a scenario 
of unwinding (risk of disorderly unfolding, 
as manifested for instance in the ﬁ  nancial 
market turmoil of summer 2007) and under a 
scenario of further increasing imbalances (risk 
of a protectionist backlash, as manifested for 
instance in the limited progress made under the 
Doha round of trade negotiations).
The project of this paper was initiated by C. Thimann and received  1 
many substantive comments in the preparation process from 
M. Fratzscher. The authors would like to thank L. Bini Smaghi, 
L. Dedola, G. Korteweg, F. Moss, C. Nordquist, G. Pineau and 
the members of the General Council of the ECB and International 
Relations Committee of the European System of Central Banks 
as well as an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. 
We also would like to thank for very stimulating discussions at 
different stages of the project A. Brender, M. Chinn, F. Perri, 
F. Pisani, J. Pisani-Ferry and F. Warnock.8
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The paper then provides an operational content 
to this deﬁ  nition by measuring trends in external 
imbalances over the past decade and putting 
these in a historical perspective (Section 3). 
Current account indicators point to widening 
external positions since the mid-1990s, with 
an acceleration in the most recent years. The 
absolute value of current account positions as 
a percentage of global GDP has doubled since 
the mid-1990s. Global deﬁ  cits are increasingly 
concentrated in a single country, the United 
States, which now absorbs around 75% of world 
net savings. Current account balances have also 
become highly persistent, with only a few large 
countries switching between deﬁ  cit and surplus 
positions over the past ten years.
Gross international ﬁ   nancial positions have 
built up even more rapidly than current account 
positions. The evolution of net foreign asset 
positions largely mirrors that of current account 
positions, with some differences due to valuation 
effects (in particular for the United States). 
Gross asset positions, however, have increased 
at a much faster pace, reﬂ  ecting  intensifying 
global ﬁ  nancial integration. Although emerging 
market economies in aggregate do not account 
for a substantial share of total gross foreign 
assets, they account for a very large share of the 
build-up in international reserve assets.
Potential distortions and risks have increased 
in tandem with the widening external positions. 
There is indeed ample evidence that the current 
pattern of global imbalances is not entirely the 
result of freely operating market forces, but 
also of policy interventions (large, persistent 
and unidirectional interventions in foreign 
exchange markets; persistent deviations of 
ﬁ  scal policy from long-run equilibria; lack of 
ﬂ  exible labour, product and ﬁ  nancial markets). 
Risks relate mainly to a scenario of unwinding 
imbalances (potential macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial disruption) but are relevant also under 
a scenario of continuously high imbalances 
(potential increase in protectionist pressures).
We argue that three main features set today’s 
situation apart from past episodes of growing 
external imbalances: (i) the emergence of new 
players, in particular emerging market economies 
such as China and India, which are quickly 
catching up with the advanced economies; (ii) an 
unprecedented wave of ﬁ  nancial  globalisation, 
with more integrated global ﬁ  nancial markets and 
increasing opportunities for international portfolio 
diversiﬁ  cation, also characterised by considerable 
asymmetries in the level of market completeness 
across countries; and (iii) the favourable global 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial environment, with 
record high global growth rates in recent years, 
low ﬁ  nancial market volatility and easy global 
ﬁ  nancing conditions over a long time period of 
time, running at least until the summer of 2007.  
Finally, the paper provides an analytical 
overview of the fundamental causes and drivers 
of global imbalances (Section 4). The central 
argument is that the increase in imbalances 
has been driven by a unique combination of 
structural and cyclical determinants. Structural 
changes in the global economy have allowed 
a widening of external positions that may be 
sustainable in the medium term. These structural 
changes have been supplemented by cyclical 
or policy-induced factors that highlight short-
run risks and create the possibility of a sudden, 
disorderly unwinding of global imbalances.
The structural determinants of global imbalances 
relate mainly to the incomplete process of 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation, which is linked to 
the lower stage of ﬁ   nancial development in 
some regions of the world. Financial market 
imperfections in fast-growing emerging 
economies combined with the rapid process of 
ﬁ  nancial globalisation has had an impact on the 
magnitude and the direction of capital ﬂ  ows 
at the global level, with capital ﬂ  owing from 
emerging to industrial economies. The effects of 
ﬁ  nancial market imperfections on capital ﬂ  ows 
are further ampliﬁ  ed by the differential impact 
of business cycle moderation and by the speciﬁ  c 
ability of the US ﬁ   nancial markets to insure 
households against idiosyncratic risks. The 
equilibrium generated by these structural factors 
cannot last forever but is sustainable in the short 
and medium term.9
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1   INTRODUCTION
Cyclical factors have further fuelled this 
structural process of widening external 
positions. These factors relate to saving/
investment patterns in the private sector (in the 
United States, for instance, accelerating private 
consumption due to a productivity-induced 
increase in US permanent income and due to 
wealth effects from rapid asset price increases) 
and the public sector (“twin” deﬁ   cits in the 
United States). If market participants start to 
question the sustainability of these patterns, 
an overshooting can happen and a disorderly 
unwinding of global economic imbalances is 
possible.
The framework provided in this paper, based 
on a clear distinction between structural 
and cyclical drivers, can provide a concrete 
operational tool for policy-makers to monitor 
developments in global imbalances. By way 
of illustration, applying the framework to 
2007, one may note that developments over 
the year were driven mainly by changes in 
cyclical factors. During the ﬁ   rst half of the 
year, real economy developments – a rotation 
of global demand – helped to bring about a 
broad stabilisation of imbalances, especially in 
the United States, although not in China. Later 
in the year, ﬁ  nancial market turmoil intensiﬁ  ed 
this rebalancing of global demand, which could 
lead to a somewhat more rapid adjustment of 
imbalances. However, with structural drivers 
remaining largely in place, a very pronounced 
reduction in the imbalances remained, as of 
autumn 2007, relatively unlikely.10
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2  DEFINING GLOBAL IMBALANCES
External imbalances are a central theme in 
international economics and a powerful driver 
of change in economic history. Under the gold 
standard, trade balance adjustment was typically 
very slow and costly for deﬁ  cit countries, which 
triggered a search for a better international 
monetary system. During the interwar period, 
growing imbalances ended in a dismantling 
of international free trade and monetary 
arrangements, adding to geopolitical tensions in 
the run-up to the Second World War. In the early 
1970s, tensions over external imbalances caused 
of a fundamental overhaul of the international 
monetary system, marking the end of the Bretton 
Woods system. In the 1980s, widening current 
account positions led to intensive international 
coordination with concrete policy commitments 
under the G5/G7 Plaza (1985) and Louvre 
(1987) agreements focusing on exchange rates. 
In the 1990s, external imbalances in emerging 
economies were a key source of concern, with a 
series of ﬁ  nancial crises sweeping across nearly 
all large emerging economies. 
Today, the world again faces large external 
imbalances. Aggregate current account positions 
as a share of global output are twice as large as 
in the mid-1980s. Gross foreign asset positions 
have increased fourfold since this period, while 
net foreign asset positions have increased 
threefold. Reserve accumulation has reached a 
never-seen pace in the past decade, a seeming 
paradox in a world of increasingly freely ﬂ  oating 
exchange rates. The fundamental operation of 
the international monetary system is again under 
discussion, and the strategic role of the IMF within 
that system is being debated. Discussions that were 
conﬁ  ned to economic policy circles have moved 
to broader political and societal levels, through 
debates over job losses, outsourcing, currency 
manipulation, and possible protectionist measures.
2.1  FEATURES OF TODAY’S IMBALANCES
Current external imbalances have appeared in 
a fundamentally new economic landscape with 
three key features. First, the global economy 
includes new players that were once at the 
periphery of global trade and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. 
Ten years ago, the global economic sphere 
was not truly global. It was limited largely 
to a tripolar world consisting of the United 
States, Europe and Japan. Emerging markets 
were largely peripheral areas of production 
and in some cases exotic niches for ﬁ  nancial 
investors. Economic liberalisation and post-
cold war political transformation have removed 
borders between the centre and the periphery. 
Falling transportation costs, the growing use of 
information technology and deepening ﬁ  nancial 
markets have reduced spatial and temporal 
distances. The slicing up of production chains 
has allowed emerging economies to specialise 
in speciﬁ  c parts of the value-added ladder.
Second, intensifying ﬁ  nancial links have altered 
the character of globalisation. Ten years ago, 
international  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows, at least in the 
emerging world, were largely the counterpart of 
trade ﬂ  ows. Today, ﬁ  nancial globalisation has 
prompted a strong increase in gross ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows. Gross international asset positions rose 
above global GDP in the early 2000s and are 
now around 1.3 times as large. This surge in 
international portfolios was made possible by a 
strong rise in overall ﬁ  nancial wealth, coupled 
with a secular decline in investors’ home bias 
and accelerated by ﬁ  nancial innovation. 
Third, the growing imbalances occurred in a 
phase of improving macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
conditions, with record high economic growth and 
record low ﬁ  nancial market volatility. Ten years 
ago, the global macroeconomic environment 
was still surrounded by considerable uncertainty. 
High business cycle volatility, ﬁ  nancial  crises 
in emerging markets (Asia, Russia, Brazil, 
Turkey), instability in pockets of the developed 
industrial ﬁ  nancial markets (Long-Term Capital 
Management) and concerns about inﬂ  ation still 
plagued the global economy. From 2004 to at 
least until early 2007 the global macroeconomic 
environment looked very stable, with global 
economic growth around 5% per annum over 
the period 2004-07. Business cycle volatility 
decreased, at least among the industrial countries. 11
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2   DEFINING 
GLOBAL 
IMBALANCES
Inﬂ  ation was tame in spite of the strong growth 
environment. Financial market volatility and risk 
aversion were at record lows. Having said that, 
a number of market corrections (for example 
in May 2006 and February 2007) as well as the 
ﬁ  nancial market turmoil that started in August 
2007 signalled that markets considered some re-
pricing of risk necessary. Still, emerging markets 
appear to have been more resilient to ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil in the mid-2000s than a decade earlier.
The emergence of new players, the 
deepening ﬁ  nancial globalisation and the stable 
macroeconomic environment complicate the 
assessment of imbalances. Large imbalances could 
be seen as an equilibrium, market-driven outcome 
in a world operating under a new paradigm. The 
sustainability of external imbalances becomes hard 
to measure, as traditional metrics of sustainability 
may not apply in an era of enhanced ﬁ  nancial 
integration. Imbalances could be argued to be 
a side effect of stronger global growth, whose 
beneﬁ  ts strongly outweigh the costs.
2.2  TWIN MOTIVES TO MONITOR TRENDS IN 
GLOBAL IMBALANCES
A good understanding and close monitoring of 
global imbalances are important for two reasons. 
First, large and protracted external imbalances 
can be linked to distortions in economic 
decision-making, especially to the extent 
that such imbalances deviate from the levels 
at which they would be in a world with full 
price ﬂ  exibility and perfect competition. Such 
deviations may be caused by public policies or 
private sector decisions. One example could be 
the unprecedented pace of reserve accumulation – 
an anachronism in an era with a never-seen share 
of currencies with ﬂ  oating exchange rate and 
central banks targeting inﬂ  ation – which may 
create distortions in asset prices. Excessively 
easy global liquidity conditions may fuel 
unwarranted risk taking and lead to bubbles in 
global asset markets. Exchange rate pegging on 
the part of some emerging economies with large 
imbalances may lead to sustained deviations 
from equilibrium. These policy choices may 
have an impact on private sector decisions and 
on  ﬁ   nancial market prices, including on the 
returns on assets held by reserve accumulators.
Second, external imbalances entail risks, both under 
a scenario of unwinding (disruptive macroeconomic 
developments) and under a scenario of further 
increasing imbalances (protectionist pressures). 
An unwinding is likely to affect all areas of the 
global economy, given the unprecedented scale 
and unique geographical reach of the imbalances. 
The large stock of international ﬁ  nancial portfolios 
increases the potential fall-out from large asset 
price changes. Financial transmission channels 
have become very important, as illustrated in 
February 2007, when a shock in a “remote” 
segment of the global ﬁ  nancial markets (Shanghai’s 
stock market) propagated to the entire spectrum of 
global ﬁ  nancial markets, or in July-August 2007, 
when tensions in a speciﬁ  c sub-segment of the 
US ﬁ  nancial markets (mortgage loans) triggered 
a generalised re-pricing of risk across nearly all 
asset classes. But risks may also appear if the 
external imbalances continue at present levels. For 
instance, the persistence of imbalances may have 
induced markets to take a complacent view of these 
imbalances and to take excessively risky investment 
positions. Also, the existence of imbalanced trade 
ﬂ  ows intensiﬁ  es calls for protectionist responses. 
In 2005 and 2006, 27 separate pieces of anti-
China trade legislation were introduced in the 
US Congress. Even if the probability of concrete 
measures may seem small, there is a broader risk 
of the ongoing trade liberalisation process coming 
to a halt, as exempliﬁ  ed by the ongoing difﬁ  culties 
in the Doha round negotiations.
These issues also matter for the euro area, even 
though the euro area’s current account is at 
present broadly balanced. The current phase of 
further growing or even constant external 
imbalances has a tangible impact on the 
European economy (including the euro area, the 
European Union and the other European 
countries).2 This effect takes place through shifts 
This effect may actually be asymmetric across countries, in  2 
particular because some European countries run a large current 
account surplus (e.g. Switzerland) and others a deﬁ  cit (as is the 
case for many of the new EU Member States from Central and 
Eastern Europe). Substantial heterogeneity can also be found 
within the euro area, but we do not tackle this issue here.12
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in trade patterns, enhanced competitive pressure, 
as well as rapid changes in industrial structures 
and in the job markets. Globalisation forces also 
have a profound impact on inﬂ   ation and on 
ﬁ  nancial developments in Europe. In the event 
of an unwinding, the euro area would again be 
directly concerned, as potential disruptions to 
global economic activity and ﬁ  nancial markets 
would clearly spill over to the euro area. 
2.3  A DEFINITION OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES
The notion of global imbalances is often used 
but rarely deﬁ   ned. This stands in contrast to 
the concept of an internal imbalance, which 
is typically operationalised in terms of full 
employment and the absence of inﬂ  ationary 
pressures. External balances have not yet 
received a similarly careful deﬁ   nition in the 
economic literature. The concept is usually 
left vague and seems to ﬂ  uctuate  between 
one extreme view (that any external position 
different from zero is an imbalance) and another 
(that any external position, no matter how 
large, reﬂ  ects a balance, as long as it is driven 
by private sector forces – what is commonly 
referred to as the Lawson doctrine).
At the outset, it would seem that one can deﬁ  ne 
global imbalances simply as “widening current 
account deﬁ   cits or surpluses”. This notion 
seemed to underpin the early work on global 
imbalances, in particular in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, when the academic and policy 
community focused mainly on understanding 
the drivers and sustainability of the US current 
account deﬁ  cit. While such a deﬁ  nition would 
be convenient, the focus on current account 
deﬁ  cits or surpluses does not do full justice to the 
phenomenon of global imbalances. In particular, 
it misses out the important ﬁ  nancial dimension of 
imbalances, as captured for instance by gross and 
net international capital ﬂ  ows and the build-up of 
international investment positions. Also, a focus 
on widening deﬁ  cits or surpluses is not helpful 
in assessing whether trends are “unbalanced” or 
“balanced”. The concept of imbalances suggests 
that positions are not in line with their long-
run equilibrium value. Therefore, a deﬁ  nition 
of imbalances should arguably contain some 
element to assess the “unbalanced” versus 
“balanced” nature of the external positions.
With these considerations in mind, we deﬁ  ne 
global imbalances as: 
External positions of systemically important 
economies that reﬂ  ect distortions or entail risks 
for the global economy.
The deﬁ  nition includes several elements:
•  “External positions”: this refers not only to 
current account balances but also to ﬁ  nancial 
positions. This is crucial in view of ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation, which implies that the ﬁ  nancial 
dimension is more than the current account 
dimension with an inverted sign.
•  “Systemically important economies”: these 
are economies whose macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial developments may have a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the global economy. While the 
concept of systemic importance is not fully 
unambiguous, it is useful because it contains 
the notion that economies participate in global 
goods and ﬁ  nancial markets, and that may 
have a global impact either because of their 
size or because of other factors (e.g. important 
ﬁ  nancial centres, key regional players).3
• “Reﬂ  ect distortions”: the build-up of external 
positions may (partly) reﬂ  ect  distortions, 
i.e. deviations from the equilibria that would 
prevail in an environment of full price 
ﬂ   exibility and perfect competition. The 
distortions can be introduced by economic 
policies, for instance ﬁ   xed exchange rate 
policies, structural policies (e.g. lack of 
economic  ﬂ  exibility),  or  macroeconomic 
policies (e.g. public saving policy-induced 
distortions in private saving decisions or the 
inﬂ  uence of cartels on oil prices). 
The list of systemically important countries may change over  3 
time. For instance, Thailand appeared to be systemically relevant 
at the onset of the 1997 Asian crisis although it accounted for a 
very small share of world output (less than 1%).13
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•  “Entail risks for the global economy”: the 
existence of external positions may pose risks 
for the global economy, both under a scenario 
of unwinding (risk of disorderly unfolding with 
disruptions to macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability) and a scenario of further increasing 
imbalances (risk of a protectionist backlash).
The reference to distortions and risks captures the 
extent to which external positions are unbalanced, 
as opposed to balanced. These two notions are 
particularly helpful from a policy viewpoint. 
Our deﬁ   nition is tailored to a policy-maker’s 
perspective, as it relates to the two potential 
sources of welfare loss from global imbalances. 
One aspect that is not included in our deﬁ  nition 
is the concept of sustainability. This is a 
deliberate choice, because measuring equilibrium 
external positions is notoriously difﬁ  cult, largely 
judgemental, and hugely dependant on the time 
horizon used. All the same, even though one may 
not need sustainability to deﬁ  ne imbalances, the 
notion may be useful as an underlying principle 
to organise an assessment of the main drivers 
of imbalances. Therefore, our discussion of the 
drivers of imbalances in Section 4 is underpinned 
by a distinction between structural factors behind 
current global imbalances – which imply a certain 
degree of sustainability over the medium term – 
and cyclical factors – which imply a potential 
element of unsustainability over the near term.
Our deﬁ  nition is sufﬁ  ciently broad to encompass 
a number of angles from which global imbalances 
have been analysed over the last few years. Until 
2003, the main focus was on current account 
positions of large economies. Around 2004, the 
focus shifted to imbalances in the international 
monetary system, as academics and policy-
makers increasingly turned to more fundamental 
explanations for the imbalances. They found such 
explanations in the set-up and functioning of the 
international monetary system (Bretton Woods 
II view of Dooley, Garber and Folkerts-Landau, 
2003). In 2005, attention shifted to imbalances 
in domestic saving and investment, with an 
emphasis on high savings and low investment 
outside the United States as key drivers of 
global imbalances. In 2006, economists started 
to formulate integrated theories on the ﬁ  nancial 
aspects of global imbalances, focusing on trends 
in the supply of and demand for ﬁ  nancial assets 
as drivers of imbalances (Caballero et al., 2006, 
Mendoza et al., 2007).
2.4  A QUANTITATIVE GLIMPSE AT GLOBAL 
IMBALANCES SINCE 1870
Although the current level of global current 
account positions seems to have risen to 
unprecedented levels, the issue of global 
imbalances is not new. A bird’s eye view of trade 
balances (Chart 1) suggests that past imbalances 
have been signiﬁ   cant. This section considers 
historical examples of global imbalances in order 
to bring the current situation into perspective.
Although history never fully repeats itself (since 
technological advances are made, communication 
facilities are improved and legal frameworks 
change), some valuable lessons can be learnt 
from the past. The objective here is not to review 
the individual developments taking place in 
each country, but to highlight two main aspects 
of global imbalances.4
A more detailed historical perspective on global imbalances is  4 
provided for instance in Brender and Pisani (2007) or in Meissner 
and Taylor (2006).
Chart 1 Trade balances since 1870




















Source: World Financial Data.14
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A synthetic view of past global imbalance 
episodes suggests substantial diversity across 
historical events (Table 1). Like any synthetic 
table, it is subject to caveats, as it implies 
summarising complex developments in one cell; 
however, it has the advantage of providing an 
overview. One key lesson to draw from the table 
is the diversity of the situations. In some periods, 
capital  ﬂ   owed from advanced economies to 
emerging markets. This was the case for instance 
during the gold standard period preceding the 
First World War, when the United Kingdom 
funded the “emerging markets” of that time (the 
United States, Canada, India and Australia). 
It was also the case during the 1990s, when 
emerging market economies (mostly in Asia 
and Latin America, but also Russia) borrowed 
from advanced countries. By contrast, some 
episodes have seen ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows taking place 
mostly among emerging markets, or among 
advanced economies (see also the box below). 
For instance, during the late 1970s oil-exporting 
countries were running sizeable current account 
surpluses, while Latin American countries were 
building up signiﬁ  cant external debt positions.
Another lesson from past global imbalance 
episodes is that not all of them unravelled in a 
disorderly fashion. During the gold standard 
period for instance, countries that were borrowing 
from the United Kingdom did not have difﬁ  culty 
in repaying their debt.5 Although the end of the 
Bretton Woods system was seen as a collapse 
(Bordo and Eichengreen, 1993), it did not map 
into a debt crisis and was not accompanied by a 
collapse of output.6 Among the cases in which 
some countries were negatively affected by the 
unwinding, there is also a lot of diversity. In some 
situations the debtor countries went through a 
period of capital drought and severe output 
decline, as in many emerging market countries in 
the 1990s (as a result of the 1995 “Tequila” crisis, 
the 1997 Asian crisis or the 1998 Russian crisis). 
Yet, in other instances, creditor countries were 
actually more severely affected than debtor 
countries. This was for instance the case of the 
US deﬁ  cit episode of the 1980s, which corrected 
during the second half of the 1980s without 
recessionary effects in the United States, whereas 
the main countries accounting for the 
corresponding surpluses, Japan and Germany, 
went through a signiﬁ  cant economic slowdown.7
Overall, the current situation is not exceptional 
by historical standards as there have been 
episodes of global imbalances before. As many 
of these episodes unravelled in a relatively 
orderly fashion, this bodes well for the present 
case. However, the current situation has 
unprecedented features in that, for the ﬁ  rst time,8 
emerging economies are actually transferring 
net savings to advanced economies, which calls 
for a careful monitoring of the situation.
The view defended here is that the event which precipitated the  5 
end of the gold standard was actually the World War I, i.e. an 
exogenous political event, rather than a collapse of the system 
due to inherent unsustainability. In addition, the gold standard 
era also witnessed some partial defaults, such as on the part of 
Russia, which had substantial economic and social effects, in 
particular in France.
If one sees the end of the Bretton Woods system as a disorderly  6 
adjustment, then this represents a unique case of disorderly 
unwinding without a build-up of global imbalances, given that 
the United States did not run substantial deﬁ  cits at the time.
Both economies were very dependent on their external sector and  7 
were affected by the reduction in US imports, while other factors 
also played a role (in the case of Germany the slowdown can also 
be partly attributed to the side effects of uniﬁ  cation).
For the ﬁ  rst time since the late nineteenth century. This does not  8 
preclude other episodes going further back in time.
Table 1 Past episodes of global imbalances
Region  Orderly unwinding for 
Era Creditor  Debtor  Creditors  Debtors
Gold Standard (<1914)  Advanced  Emerging  Yes  Yes 
Bretton Woods  None  None  Yes  Yes 
1970s Emerging  Emerging  No  No 
1980s Advanced  Advanced  Some  Yes 
1990s Advanced  Emerging  Yes  No 
2000s Emerging  Advanced  ?  ? 15
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A REVIEW OF PAST EPISODES OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES  1
The gold standard era (until 1914)
The gold standard era, at least in the period preceding the First World War, was characterised by 
relatively high mobility of capital across countries, together with signiﬁ  cant stability in exchange 
rates. This feature of the world ﬁ  nancial system greatly facilitated a large ﬂ  ow of investment 
from industrial countries (mostly the United Kingdom but also France) to the (then) emerging 
markets, such as the United States, Canada, Australia or India. The main difference between this 
and the current situation is that ﬂ  ows are now running in the other direction, from poor to rich 
countries.
The Bretton Woods era
While the Bretton Woods system also relied on ﬁ  xed exchange rates, it differed from the gold 
standard as strong restrictions existed on cross-border capital ﬂ  ows. In fact, the Bretton Woods 
system did not allow large transfers of net savings between countries through trade. In this system, 
a country running a large trade deﬁ  cit would normally, in agreement with the IMF, engineer a 
devaluation of its currency in order to regain competitiveness and reduce the deﬁ  cit. The Bretton 
Woods system arrangement was ended through the exhaustion of international reserves in the 
anchor country.
The oil shocks of the 1970s
In the 1970s, a major terms of trade shock occurred in the world economy, implying a net 
transfer of resources from oil-importing countries to oil producers. By deﬁ  nition, for the oil-
exporting countries to run a surplus, other countries had to run a deﬁ  cit, and Latin American 
countries accounted for part of this. The unravelling of this situation started with a rise in interest 
rates in the United States, which substantially added to the burden of Latin American countries, 
whose external debt was at ﬂ  oating interest rates. The reduction in absorption among Latin 
American countries, but also some advanced economies, in the late-1970s and mid 1980s also a 
had signiﬁ  cant impact on the oil-exporting countries (Saudi Arabia actually ran a current account 
deﬁ  cit in the mid 1980s).
The widening and correction of the US deﬁ  cit in the 1980s
The main counterparts of the rise in the US deﬁ  cit in the early 1980s were advanced economies 
(Japan, Germany and the Netherlands). The second part of the 1980s saw a relatively orderly 
unwinding of global imbalances, accompanied by a gradual depreciation of the US dollar, 
supported by –among other things— low interest rates in Japan. However, one could partly (and 
indirectly) attribute the recession in Japan in the 1990s to the resolution of the US deﬁ  cits in 
the 1980s, as the low interest rates in Japan contributed to the build-up of a ﬁ  nancial bubble in 
Japanese ﬁ  nancial assets, whose bursting had a marked deﬂ  ationary effect in the 1990s.
1  A detailed account and very informative discussion of these past episodes of global imbalances can be found in Brender and Pisani 
(2007).16
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The emerging markets crises of the 1980s and 1990s
In the 1980s and 1990s, many emerging markets were affected by severe ﬁ  nancial debt crises, 
which had sizeable real effects (with output losses sometimes amounting to 20% of GDP). One 
particular aspect of these crises is that they corresponded to the classical case of (relatively) rich 
lenders investing in poorer debtor countries. It is an understatement to say that most of these 
episodes ended in a disorderly fashion for the debtors. For the creditors, by contrast, the losses 
were relatively contained (which can be partly related to the currency composition of the debt 
and the associated valuation gains and losses). This example suggests that even when capital 
ﬂ  ows are from rich to poor countries a disorderly unwinding is still possible. 17
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Although the strong increase in the US current 
account deﬁ   cit has become one of the main 
international policy issues in recent years, the 
topic of global imbalances is not new. Indeed, 
economic history provides numerous examples 
of large transfers of net savings between 
countries or regions which at the time raised the 
question of the sustainability of the imbalance. 
Two natural questions emerge from such 
historical comparisons: ﬁ  rst, to what extent are 
current developments comparable to these past 
events, and second, what lessons can be learnt 
from past adjustment episodes. Answering these 
questions is challenging given the difﬁ  culty of 
measuring global imbalances; it is not possible to 
summarise global imbalances in a single index.9
Accordingly, this section provides a range of 
indicators, covering four speciﬁ   c aspects of 
global imbalances: (i) the dispersion of current 
account positions across countries, (ii) measures 
of imbalances on the ﬁ  nancial side (focusing on 
gross and net foreign asset positions), (iii) a set 
of indirect measures of the economic distortions 
behind global imbalances, and (iv) some 
estimates of the associated risks. While these 
indicators have been used in the past for 
different applications, this is the ﬁ  rst time they 
have appeared together in the context of global 
imbalances.
3.1  STATISTICAL MEASURES OF WORLD 
CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITIONS
The extent of global imbalances can be gauged 
by looking at the distribution of current 
account positions over time, focusing on (i) the 
magnitude of absolute current account balances, 
(ii) their concentration across countries, and 
(iii) their persistence over time.
The absolute value of current account positions 
indicates not only an increase in global 
imbalances over time, but also an acceleration 
in recent years, both in value terms and as a 
percentage of world GDP (Chart 2).10
Whereas this index remained broadly stable 
during the 1980s and the ﬁ  rst part of the 1990s 
(between 2% and 3% of world GDP), it rose 
to nearly 4% in 2000. After a small decrease in 
2001,11 it increased at a faster pace thereafter, to 
reach well above 5% in just four years.12 Scaling 
current account balances with world GDP allows 
in particular global growth to be controlled for: a 
given country could indeed run a current account 
deﬁ   cit permanently (in value terms) and be in 
a perfectly sustainable situation, as long as the 
absolute value of this deﬁ  cit is below its growth 
rate. As a ﬁ  nal comment on this statistical measure, 
one can note that aggregating the absolute value 
An additional difﬁ  culty stems from the fact that ofﬁ  cial statistics  9 
may imperfectly reﬂ  ect the true magnitude of global imbalances. 
In particular, the puzzling link between the US income account and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks has attracted a lot of attention 
(Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005). A potential explanation for 
this puzzle is related to the role of multinational companies’ transfer 
prices and to tax arbitrage across countries. This paper does not 
tackle the issue of statistical measurement problems.
This measure is also used by the IMF in its G7 surveillance note  10 
(9 February 2007).
In 2001 the US current account deﬁ  cit fell below USD 390 billion,  11 
from USD 415 billion in 2000. The deceleration in US domestic output 
growth in 2001 (to 0.8%) and the accompanying deceleration in the 
growth rate of domestic demand may explain in particular weak US 
imports in that year (they fell, in real terms, by 2.7% year on year). The 
euro area current account deﬁ  cit also fell markedly in 2001. In addition, 
the surpluses of several countries decreased noticeably in 2001 (this 
includes China, Canada, Japan and several Asian emerging markets).
The small decrease that took place in 2001 may have been partly related  12 
to lower oil prices, which reduced the current account surplus of oil-
exporting countries, and to lower output growth in the United States.
Chart 2 Sum of current account balances 
in the world
(USD billions; as a percentage of world GDP)
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.18
ECB
Occasional Paper No 78
January 2008
of global current account positions could lead to 
double accounting, as any given deﬁ  cit should by 
deﬁ  nition be matched by a corresponding surplus. 
An alternative deﬁ   nition could then consist in 
dividing the measure plotted on Chart 2 by two. 
While this would affect the level of the variable, 
it obviously would not change its growth rate 
over time: by this standard, the build-up of global 
imbalances over time has been very substantial. 
Finally, one may also point out that the creation of 
the euro area in 1999 reduces somewhat the extent 
of global imbalances. When intra-euro area trade is 
subtracted from total current account balances, the 
index represented in Chart 2 is nearly 16% lower. 
However, this does not affect the trend.
However, this aggregate measure hides large 
differences across countries and regions (Chart 3). 
In particular, the strong increase in the US current 
account deﬁ   cit (which roughly doubled from 
slightly above USD 400 billion in 2000 to over 
USD 800 billion in 2006) constitutes one of the 
key factors behind the rising concerns about 
global imbalances. The main counterparts of the 
US deﬁ  cit are very substantial surpluses in China 
and oil-exporting countries, such that the issue of 
global imbalances is now considered a “shared 
responsibility” of the international community.
Taking a longer-run perspective, several 
countries have experienced noticeable changes 
in their current account balances (see Table 2, 
which includes only the 50 largest economies in 
the world). This is in particular the case of Saudi 
Arabia, which switched from having the largest 
deﬁ  cit as a percentage of GDP in 1985 to having 
the largest surplus in 2005. Several emerging 
markets also moved from a large deﬁ  cit in the 
early 1980s to a surplus in later years. Some 
industrial countries ran sizeable deﬁ  cits  for 
most of this period (e.g. Australia), which could 
suggest that persistent deﬁ  cits are not necessarily 
unsustainable, while others ran mostly surpluses 
throughout the period. This is in particular the 
case of Japan and of the Netherlands, whose 
current account surpluses have been between 
6% and 9% of GDP for a considerable period 
of time. It is also noticeable that in 2005, the 
group of nine countries whose current account 
was above 9% of GDP included six emerging 
market economies (the three advanced countries 
were Switzerland, Norway and Singapore); it 
also included the majority of the oil-exporting 
countries (ﬁ   ve out of nine). Historically, the 
group of countries with a current account surplus 
above 9% of GDP has never been as large. This 
already indicates the high dispersion of current 
account balances on the surplus side, which is 
addressed in more detail below.
The pattern of current account imbalances is 
also changing in another important respect: 
while current account deﬁ  cits are increasingly 
concentrated in a single country (the United 
States), current account surpluses are spread 
across a number of economies. Whereas the 
statistical measure presented in Chart 2 suggests 
that current account positions in the world are 
widening, another issue is whether this process is 
shared equally across countries or is conﬁ  ned to 
a few, large economies. Inference on the degree 
of dispersion can be gained by considering the 
following statistical measures:
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with CAi indicating the current account in 
(US dollar) nominal terms and  CAi its absolute 
value.
An increase in these indices denotes a greater 
dispersion across countries and a decrease 
denotes a concentration in smaller number of 
countries. The index “Ssurpluses” is computed only 
for surplus countries and the index “Sdeﬁ  cits” only 
for deﬁ  cit countries. If there are N countries, 
this measure is bounded between 1 (a single 
country accounts for the total, i.e. concentration 
has reached its maximum) and N (the countries 
have equal shares of the total, i.e. dispersion has 
reached its maximum).
Table 2 Current account balances – major economy groupings
as a percentage of GDP
1985  1995   2005  2006 
Deﬁ  cits above 9% of GDP 
Saudi  Arabia  -12.5 Malaysia  -9.7 New  Zealand  -9.0  -8.8 
Greece -12.3  Thailand -7.9 
Poland -10.3 
Deﬁ  cits between 6% and 9% of GDP 
Chile  -8.6 Hong  Kong  -6.3 Turkey  -6.3  -8.0 
New Zealand  -7.3  United States  -6.4  -6.5 
Australia -5.8  -5.4 
Deﬁ  cits between 3% and 6% of GDP 
Australia  -5.3 Israel  -5.3 South  Africa  -3.8  -6.4 
Egypt -4.8  Australia  -5.2 
Denmark -4.6  New  Zealand  -5.0 
Ireland -4.5  Colombia  -5.0 
Thailand -4.0  Saudi  Arabia  -3.7 
Colombia -3.9  Ukraine  -3.1 
China -3.8  Indonesia  -3.0 
Surpluses between 3% and 6% of GDP 
Japan  3.8 Sweden  3.4 Denmark  3.6  2.0 
Israel  4.0 Norway  3.5 Egypt  3.2  0.8 
South  Africa  4.1 Iran  3.7 Japan  3.6  3.9 
Switzerland  4.3 Finland  4.1 Taiwan   4.6  7.1 
Norway  4.9  United Arab Emirates  5.1 
Venezuela 6.0  Belgium  5.6 
Surpluses between 6% and 9% of GDP 
Netherlands  7.2 Netherlands  6.2 China  7.2  9.1 
Hong  Kong  7.5 Switzerland  6.8 Sweden  7.0  7.4 
Iran 7.4  6.7 
Surpluses above 9% of GDP 
Taiwan   14.5 Singapore  17.1 Russia  10.9  9.8 
United Arab Emirates  25.3  Hong Kong  11.4  10.2 
Switzerland 16.8  18.5 
United Arab Emirates  15.8  16.3 
Malaysia 15.2  15.8 
Norway 15.5  16.7 
Venezuela 17.8  15.0 
Singapore 24.5  27.5 
Saudi Arabia  29.3  27.4 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. This table only considers the world’s 50 largest economies. Euro area countries are reported 
individually only until 1999. 20
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Since 1980 the dispersion of current account 
positions has changed considerably, with 
noticeable differences between deﬁ  cit countries 
and surplus countries (Chart 4). The magnitude 
of global deﬁ  cits is overwhelmingly accounted 
for by the United States, which in 2005 absorbed 
over two-thirds of world net savings.13 In fact, 
the concentration of world deﬁ  cits in a single 
country (the United States) has considerably 
increased over time. The dotted (red) line in 
Chart 4, representing the degree of dispersion 
for the countries running a deﬁ   cit, falls over 
time, indicating greater concentration in a single 
country. In 1985, for instance, when the United 
States registered what was at the time a record 
high deﬁ   cit, it accounted for 54% of world 
deﬁ  cits. In 1990 this proportion had fallen to 
only 25%. The ﬁ  gure is now around 75% if one 
considers the euro area as an aggregate (and 
63% otherwise, as intra-euro area deﬁ  cits are 
added up to the total, therefore increasing the 
denominator). 
Turning to current account surpluses, the 
dispersion of current account balances has 
actually increased over time: the blue line on 
Chart 4 has risen since the early 1990s (from 
around 5 to nearly 15 now), implying also that 
more countries account for world surpluses 
now than in the mid-1980s. This means that 
the surpluses that mirror the US deﬁ  cit are in 
a larger number of countries than before. In 
2005, ﬁ  ve countries accounted for 50% of world 
surpluses (Japan, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia 
and Russia, noting that Germany’s surplus 
is part of the euro area’s overall balanced 
external position). In 1985, three countries only 
accounted for 50% of world surpluses (Japan, 
Germany and the Netherlands). 
A rising number of countries accounting for 
world surpluses has the advantage of spreading 
risks across a larger number of players; 
however, it may also make the resolution of 
global imbalances more difﬁ   cult. Indeed, it 
may introduce a problem of coordination across 
the regions responsible for the imbalances. 
For instance, in the 1980s, the US deﬁ  cit was 
largely accounted for – on a bilateral basis – 
by Germany (8.2%) and Japan (33.5%), which 
made international negotiations, especially in 
a G7 context, relatively easier. By contrast, 
surplus countries now include developed 
economies, emerging markets in Asia (primarily 
China, 26.3%) and Latin America (Mexico, 
6.3%), as well as oil-exporting countries 
(Saudi Arabia, 2.7% only). The heterogeneity 
of these countries also implies a broader set 
of adjustment mechanisms, as reﬂ  ected in the 
IMF’s multilateral consultation.
Finally, one can also observe a strong 
persistence of current account balances since 
the mid-1990s. The individual current account 
positions shown in Chart 3 reveal that the 
main economic regions mostly run increasing 
surpluses or increasing deﬁ  cits, but rarely switch 
from one to the other. One exception is the euro 
This ﬁ  gure rises to 75% when the euro area is considered as an  13 
aggregate. In Chart 3 (which goes back to 1990) the euro area is 
considered as a single country. In Charts 2 and 4, which go further 
back in time, the euro area countries are considered individually 
to make the comparison possible. This makes an important 
difference, as the euro area as a whole runs a current account 
position close to balance, whereas some of its individual countries 
run large surpluses (4.1 % of GDP for Germany and 6.3% for the 
Netherlands) or deﬁ  cits (7.4% for Spain, above 9% for Portugal 
and 7.8% for Greece). It is noticeable that, also within the euro 
area, the current account balances of the member countries 
widened during the 1990s and early 2000s, although a full analysis 
of this pattern is beyond the scope of the present study.
Chart 4 Average dispersion of current 
account balance

















Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
Note: An increase denotes higher dispersion/lower concentration.21
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area, which switched from a moderate deﬁ  cit 
to a moderate surplus in 2002, and back to a 
moderate deﬁ  cit in 2005. Since 1980 the United 
States has run a surplus only in 1991.
The persistence of current account positions can 
be assessed by looking at the following measure 
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This measure is bounded between 0 and 1, 
with 0 indicating maximum persistence and 1 
maximum volatility. Following this deﬁ  nition, 
an increase reﬂ  ects higher volatility, or lower 
persistence; it is therefore convenient to take 
the inverse of Spersistence and plot it against time 
(Chart 5). Throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, persistence actually increased over time, 
implying that the same countries persistently 
ran similar deﬁ  cits (e.g. in the case of the United 
States) or surpluses (e.g. oil-exporting countries 
or China). For 2006, the persistence indicator 
shows a very high increase, mainly because 
the US deﬁ  cit did not increase as much as in 
previous years.
3.2  STATISTICAL MEASURES OF NET FOREIGN 
ASSETS POSITIONS
The evolution of net foreign asset positions 
in recent years partly mirrors that of current 
account positions (Chart 6). In particular, the 
magnitude of world net foreign positions has 
increased signiﬁ  cantly since the late 1990s, and 
the United States has the highest liabilities in the 
world (more than 5% of world GDP). However, 
marked differences can also be noted. First, 
the magnitude of US net liabilities has actually 
decreased since 2002 (owing to the depreciation 
of the US dollar and valuation changes, often 
attributed to the “dark matter” puzzle of 
possibly unaccounted assets, see Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger, 2005). Also, the United States 
accounts for a relatively small share of total net 
foreign liabilities in the world (slightly over one-
third) compared with its share in current account 
deﬁ  cits (75%). This comparatively lower level 
of net foreign liabilities may partly attenuate 
the risk of a disorderly adjustment; however, 
the factors that explained this discrepancy in 
the past may unravel in the future. In particular, 
one should not take for granted that foreign 
investors will be willing to accumulate low-
interest-bearing US assets eternally.
Another key difference between net foreign 
asset positions and current account positions is 
that while emerging markets account for the 
largest share of the increase in current account 
surpluses, they do not seem to contribute to the 
rise in net foreign assets (Chart 6).14 In fact, non-
industrial countries now account for about one-
third of net foreign liabilities. 
Further, looking at gross foreign assets 
(Chart 7), emerging markets account for a very 
small part (less than 10%) of the total. This, 
again, may require a reassessment of the role 
of emerging markets in the unfolding of global 
imbalances, as they actually account for a much 
However, net errors and omissions are sizeable for net foreign  14 
assets and could be partly allocated to emerging markets, where 
statistical reporting is generally perceived to be less accurate 
than in advanced economies. In addition, one important source of 
statistical discrepancies might be the valuation of FDI positions 
in non-listed companies.
Chart 5 Average persistence of global 




















Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: An increase denotes higher persistence.22
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smaller proportion of net and gross foreign 
asset positions than suggested by recent current 
account balances.
A detailed list of the world’s largest debtors 
and creditors in 2005 reveals a relatively mixed 
pattern (Table 3). On the net foreign liabilities 
side, the three largest “countries” are all 
industrial (the United states, the euro area and 
Australia). However, Brazil and Mexico rank 
fourth and ﬁ   fth respectively, with cumulated 
net foreign liabilities (above USD 600 billion) 
Table 3 Largest external debtors and creditors 
15 largest debtors 15 largest creditors
Country USD bn % GDP Country USD bn % GDP
1 United States -2,546 -20 1 Japan 1,532 34
2 Euro area -1,009 -10 2 Switzerland 363 99
3 Australia -389 -55 3 China 287 13
4 Mexico -349 -45 4 Saudi Arabia 119 38
5 Brazil -329 -41 5 Singapore 105 89
6 United Kingdom -294 -13 6 Algeria 43 42
7 Turkey -169 -47 7 Venezuela 37 28
8 Canada -151 -13 8 Iran 36 19
9 Poland -124 -41 9 Libya 34 88
10 Indonesia -106 -38 10 Argentina 19 10
11 South Korea -95 -12 11 Syria 13 49
12 Hungary -94 -86 12 Botswana 8 78
13 New Zealand -92 -85 13 Nigeria 8 8
14 Sweden -87 -24 14 Bahrain 7 55
15 Thailand -58 -34 15 Oman 5 15
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
Note: The euro area is here considered as a single entity.
Chart 6 Net foreign asset positions
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
Note: The category “other industrial” on the liability side refers 
to industrial countries excluding the United States.
Chart 7 Gross foreign asset positions
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larger than China’s net foreign assets (USD 
287 billion). On the assets side, the ﬁ  ve largest 
creditors actually include several industrial 
countries (noticeably Japan and Switzerland, 
Singapore being perhaps a special case due to its 
size and role as a ﬁ  nancial centre). This means 
that emerging market economies are currently 
accumulating net foreign assets through current 
account surpluses in ﬂ  ow terms, but many of 
them still remain net debtors on a stock basis. 
Another implication is that the United States 
accounts for a much smaller proportion of world 
net foreign liabilities (around 37%) than its share 
of world net current account deﬁ  cits (75%). This 
discrepancy is partly due to the fact that many 
emerging markets, such as Brazil and Mexico, 
currently record current account positions close 
to balance, whereas they still hold net debtor 
positions (thus increasing the denominator when 
it comes to measuring the share of the United 
States in total world net debtor positions). In 
addition, the particular dynamics of the US 
net international investment position have 
played a crucial role, as the sum of past current 
account deﬁ  cits notoriously exceeds in absolute 
value the level of the country’s net liabilities. 
The difference between the two measures is 
accounted for both by the high returns earned on 
US assets abroad and the low interest on paid 
US liabilities to foreigners. These factors may, 
however, not persist indeﬁ   nitely (in fact, the 
US income account moved from a surplus to a 
deﬁ  cit in 2006).
Finally, another noteworthy fact is that gross 
asset positions (Chart 7) have increased at a 
much faster pace than net positions.15 Between 
1995 and 2006 gross foreign assets in the world 
increased from 55% to 130% of world GDP, 
whereas net foreign assets rose only from 7% to 
15% over the same period. In other words, the 
increase in ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows across countries has 
been relatively balanced, since they have been 
matched by offsetting ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows. This is 
consistent with a higher degree of ﬁ  nancial 
integration and risk-sharing and a lower home 
bias, and in turn suggests that cross-border 
capital ﬂ  ows have taken place not so much to 
participate in a transfer of net saving across 
countries as to spread risk and/or allocate 
resources more efﬁ  ciently. 
Although emerging markets as an aggregate 
do not account for a substantial share of (total) 
gross foreign assets, they contribute to a very 
substantial part of the build-up in international 
reserve assets (Chart 8). Total reserve assets 
have in particular reached nearly USD 1 trillion 
in China, mainly reﬂ  ecting a ﬁ  xed exchange rate 
policy amid a rising current account surplus.
3.3  INDICATORS OF DISTORTIONS
External positions do not always reﬂ  ect 
optimising behaviour of private agents. They 
may also be the result of distortions in the 
functioning of global goods and ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The presence of distortions is a source 
of concern as it represents a net welfare loss to 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) also note, based on a “Grubel- 15 
Lloyd” index, that (since the late 1980s) “the growth in gross 
asset trade has been more dramatic than the increased dispersion 
in net positions”. The Grubel-Lloyd index is deﬁ  ned  as 
1 – [ |A-L| / (A+L)], where A and L stand for assets and liabilities 
respectively: this index is therefore bounded between 0 (if asset 
trade occurs solely to ﬁ  nance net positions) and 1 (if the net 
position is zero and only gross cross-border asset trade takes 
place). For further detail see Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2005) p. 3 
and Fig. 4, p. 34.
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the global economy. Economic distortions can 
arise in different contexts and take various forms. 
We focus here on four key distorting factors 
that may have an impact on the build-up and 
persistence of external imbalances: (i) foreign 
exchange interventions, (ii) macroeconomic and 
structural policies, (iii) the role of governments 
in shaping and developing domestic ﬁ  nancial 
markets and (iv) international regulatory barriers 
(to trade in goods but also to ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows). 
3.3.1 FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS
A ﬁ  rst type of distortion relates to interventions 
in foreign exchange markets.  Unlike  ﬂ  oating 
exchange rates, which are determined by market 
forces,  ﬁ   xed or pegged exchange rates result 
from government decisions to keep the currency 
at a predetermined level. While a ﬁ  xed rate is 
not a distortion per se, it may become one if the 
exchange rate is persistently maintained at a 
level that does not reﬂ  ect  economic 
fundamentals. One indication of such a distortion 
is the occurrence of large, one-sided and 
prolonged interventions in foreign exchange 
markets, leading to a large and persistent build-
up of foreign exchange reserves. Since the early 
2000s the rapid growth of reserves in some 
regions of the world (particularly among Asian 
emerging markets, Chart 7) can be considered 
an indirect measure of this. This indirect 
evidence is backed up by estimates of currency 
undervaluation with regard to fundamental or 
equilibrium exchange rate levels. In the case of 
China, academic estimates of the degree of 
undervaluation of the renminbi vary noticeably 
across studies but tend to be substantial.16 This 
suggests that the distortions to global trade 
patterns are indeed very considerable. In 
addition, keeping a pegged exchange rate has 
other drawbacks for China, as monetary policy 
is constrained by this external objective and 
cannot fully address domestic objectives.
3.3.2 DISTORTIONS ARISING FROM 
MACROECONOMIC OR STRUCTURAL POLICIES
A second type of distortion may arise from 
macroeconomic or structural policies and their 
impact on the current account. Examples of 
such distortions can for instance be found in 
the role of ﬁ  scal policy. It is well documented 
that changes in the ﬁ  scal position tend to have 
an impact on the current account deﬁ  cit.  In 
the case of the United States, for instance, part 
of the widening current account deﬁ  cit in the 
early 2000s can be ascribed to the widening 
ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit (“twin deﬁ  cit” relationship), even 
though estimates of the precise magnitude 
of that relationship vary. What is less often 
invoked, but potentially also crucial, is that the 
design of ﬁ  scal policy (e.g. taxation regimes) 
may also affect saving/investment decisions 
of private agents and signiﬁ   cantly affect the 
allocation of resources, both domestically and 
internationally.17 Governments also have a 
role to play in implementing structural reforms 
aimed at enhancing long-term output growth. 
This particular type of measure has been 
regularly tackled at G7 meetings and in the IMF 
multilateral consultation for the euro area and 
Japan. Indeed, distortions affecting the goods, 
labour and ﬁ   nancial markets have a strong 
impact on potential output, which in turn affects 
current account prospects. 
3.3.3 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS
A third distortion may relate to governments’ 
contribution – or lack thereof – to shaping and 
developing domestic ﬁ   nancial markets. For 
many emerging market economies (China, for 
instance, but also oil-exporting countries), the 
underdevelopment of their ﬁ  nancial  markets 
may have a substantial impact on saving and 
investment patterns, and hence on current 
account positions. The presence of such 
distortions can be interpreted as part of the 
heritage from a former economic system which 
is gradually being phased out as the country 
moves towards a free market economy. Section 4 
will return to the issue of missing assets in some 
of the emerging economies.
On average across studies, the degree of undervaluation  16 
is estimated to be around 30%, but this hides signiﬁ  cant 
heterogeneity across the different estimates. In addition, the 
papers estimated the degree of undervaluation using very 
different methods.
The level of domestic corporate taxes can, for example, affect  17 
the incentives for local entrepreneurs to invest abroad through 
subsidiaries, which in turn may affect the composition of the 
current account and the level of cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows.25
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3.3.4 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY BARRIERS
The fourth type of distortion stems from 
international regulatory barriers. Several 
indicators of protectionism,18 for instance 
indicators of non-tariff regulatory measures 
relating to trade, indicate that restrictions have 
remained substantial in recent years in key 
world economies (Chart 9). Indices of foreign 
capital market restrictions also indicate that such 
barriers increased somewhat in the United States, 
Japan and the euro area since 2000 (Chart 10).
The role of international production cartels 
can also be mentioned in this context. The 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) is probably the most 
prominent international cartel. The 12-country 
organisation (which includes Iraq, Indonesia, 
Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
and Venezuela) accounts for over 40% of 
world production of oil and is still able to 
considerably inﬂ  uence oil prices, although its 
market power has somewhat decreased since the 
late 1970s due to increased production in other 
regions of the world, such as Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) countries and the 
North Sea oilﬁ  elds.
The level of distortions resulting from 
regulation can also be indirectly gauged 
through estimates of the welfare gains that 
may result from their removal. For instance, 
in a survey report on the effects of liberalising 
world agricultural trade, the US Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ   ce (2005) concludes that “the 
likely total annual economic beneﬁ   t to the 
world in 2015 from efﬁ   ciency gains and 
investment growth that would result from full 
agricultural liberalization from 2005 through 
2010 is in the range of roughly $50 billion to 
$185 billion (measured in 2001 dollars), or 
0.1 percent to 0.4 percent of the value of world 
output of all goods and services. Expanding the 
analysis to include the effects of liberalization 
on the rate of productivity growth can raise the 
estimates by amounts ranging from 50 percent 
to more than 100%, depending on the study”.
3.4  INDICATORS OF RISKS
External positions may also entail risks for 
the global economy irrespective of whether 
they originate from distortions or not. Clearly, 
the presence of distortions may represent a 
source of additional risk for economic agents. 
However, even if external positions are due only 
As protectionism is also a risk, Section 3.4 returns to  18 
protectionism as one of the key risks arising from global 
imbalances.
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to optimising behaviour of private agents, risks 
may arise. The Lawson doctrine, which holds 
that current account imbalances should not be 
of concern to policy-makers when they result 
from the free decisions of private agents, 
may not hold in all circumstances. It has been 
challenged – for instance, during the Asian 
crisis – by the suggestion that signiﬁ  cant risks 
can arise even in the absence of distortions. We 
consider in this section two main sources of 
risks: those relating to sharp movements in real 
output, in exchange rates and in asset prices, and 
those relating to a protectionist backlash. This 
section also concludes with a discussion of the 
relationship between risks and distortions.
3.4.1 THE DISORDERLY ADJUSTMENT SCENARIO
A ﬁ  rst type of risk relates to the potential for 
a disorderly unwinding of external positions. 
Countries running large current account deﬁ  cits 
run the risk of a disorderly adjustment, for 
example through a drop in domestic growth, 
as in the emerging market crises of the 1980s 
and 1990s. One key characteristic of this risk is 
that it belongs to the category of risks of “low 
probability, high impact” events (Kohn, 2004). 
More importantly, global imbalances not only 
present a risk to the economies concerned but 
constitute a systemic risk to the global economy 
as a whole.
This risk of a disorderly unwinding can in 
turn be broken down into two main elements: 
sharp asset price movements and a substantial 
drop in output. Although the probability of a 
disorderly unwinding of global imbalances is 
relatively low, the potential impact is so large 
that policy action may be imperative. A recent 
special issue of the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook concluded in particular, on the basis of 
simulations using the IMF’s Global Economy 
Model (GEM), that this scenario could imply a 
loss in real output – compared with the baseline 
case – equal to more than 5 percentage points of 
GDP in the United States, 6 percentage points in 
emerging Asia and around 5 percentage points in 
the euro area and Japan. Another key feature of 
the “disruptive scenario” identiﬁ  ed by the IMF 
is the sharp depreciation of the dollar (by 20% 
in real effective terms). However, this remains 
well within values put forward by academic 
research (see e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004, 
or Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005).
Empirical regularities from past deﬁ  cit 
adjustments conﬁ  rm the negative impact of an 
unwinding of current account deﬁ  cits on asset 
prices and output. Various authors, starting with 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) and Freund 
(2005), have found that such adjustments have 
on average been accompanied by a slowdown in 
real GDP growth and currency depreciations in 
the deﬁ  cit countries. At the same time, these 
average trends mask an important degree of 
dispersion across episodes. Algieri and Bracke 
(2007) ﬁ  nd that adjustment episodes can usefully 
be classiﬁ  ed in three groups. In a ﬁ  rst group, 
representing roughly half of the cases, the 
adjustments were mainly internal, involving 
slowing real GDP growth but not much 
movement in real exchange rates. In a second 
group, in which adjustment was external, 
representing a quarter of the cases, the exchange 
rate recorded a depreciation while growth 
accelerated. In a third group, comprising the 
remaining quarter of the cases, there was a 
crisis-like combination of a sharp depreciation 
Chart 11 Growth and exchange rate 




















x-axis: change in real GDP growth (in percentage points)
y-axis: change in real effective exchange rate
(in percent)
Source: Algieri and Bracke (2007).27
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and a sizeable economic slowdown (see 
Chart 11). Interestingly, the study found that 
large exchange rate changes were often not a 
part of the adjustment episodes, in particular 
among industrial countries.19
3.4.2 THE RISK OF A PROTECTIONIST BACKLASH
A second type of risk relates to the potential 
build-up of protectionist barriers in response 
to growing imbalances. In a scenario where 
imbalances do not adjust quickly, there is a 
growing risk of rising political pressure for 
protectionist solutions to reduce them. While 
such solutions may at ﬁ  rst glance offer an easy 
way to contain increasing imbalances, they are 
bound to have a disruptive impact on global 
trade and global output growth. These risks 
cannot be neglected as there are currently a 
dozen bills of this nature in the US Congress, 
the most threatening including proposals to 
declare China’s weak currency an illegal 
subsidy and allow American ﬁ   rms to seek 
compensatory tariffs. A Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York paper by Faruqee et al. (2006b) 
has investigated the impact of trade barriers: 
if imposed simultaneously by all countries, an 
increase in import tariffs would reduce economic 
growth in all countries (by 1.2 percentage points 
of GDP in the United States, 3.2 percentage 
points in emerging Asia, 2.8 percentage points 
in the group comprising Japan and the euro area 
and 2.4 percentage points for the remaining 
countries).
3.4.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISKS AND 
DISTORTIONS
As a ﬁ  nal point, one may underline that while 
distortions and risks are to some extent related, 
they may also materialise independently from 
one another. On the one hand, the presence of 
distortions can increase risks (for example, 
government  ﬁ   scal or structural policy may 
contribute to raising the current account deﬁ  cit 
in the United States, which in turn increases the 
risk of a disorderly adjustment). Conversely, 
the presence of risks can bring more distortions: 
for example, the large US bilateral trade deﬁ  cit 
with China is perceived to be contributing to 
a rise in protectionist sentiment. On the other 
hand, it is important for policy purposes to 
focus on distortions and risks independently 
of one another. One could think, for example, 
of a situation where the presence of distortions 
has reduced risks (this would be the case in a 
very regulated environment, for example), 
at the cost of a substantial welfare loss for 
the world economy. In this case it would be a 
policy challenge to tackle these distortions, even 
though risks are contained. 
See also “Spillovers and cycles in the global economy”, World  19 
Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2007, in particular the event 
analysis presented in Chapter 3, “Exchange rates and the 
adjustment of external imbalances”.28
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4  STRUCTURAL AND CYCLICAL FACTORS
In this section, we present a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of global imbalances. 
In what follows, we separate determinants of 
global imbalances into two sub-groups:
(1) structural determinants of widening current 
account positions that explain the surprising 
persistence of global imbalances; and 
(2)  cyclical factors, which imply short-run 
ﬂ  uctuations in external positions.
The chosen categorisation  20 of factors is 
probably only one of many, and as usual the 
exact allocation of certain factors to one or the 
other group is not always straightforward. That 
being said, the chosen framework offers a new 
perspective on global imbalances by providing a 
rationale for the surprising persistence of global 
balances, without neglecting the potential risk 
associated with a disorderly unwinding.
The literature on the structural determinants of 
global imbalances is still in its infancy but has 
been growing in the recent years. The main 
idea can be described as follows: ﬁ  nancial 
market imperfections in fast-growing emerging 
economies combined with the rapid process 
of ﬁ  nancial globalisation has had a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the magnitude and the direction of 
capital ﬂ  ows at the global level.
The effects of ﬁ  nancial market imperfections 
on capital ﬂ  ows have been further ampliﬁ  ed 
by the differential impact of business cycle 
moderation and by the ability of the US 
ﬁ  nancial markets to allow households to insure 
against idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, the 
almost unique position of the United States 
as a provider of “safe” assets, not only in 
“good” but particularly in “bad” times, is also 
a possible explanation for the large size of 
capital ﬂ  ows into the United States. 
It is, however, important to emphasise that the 
notion of “structural global imbalances” does 
not necessarily indicate that the outcome is 
desirable or welfare-optimal, as the underlying 
imbalances are sometimes the result of 
(remaining) distortions, as exempliﬁ  ed by the 
notion of imperfect  ﬁ  nancial  globalisation. 
But, if global imbalances are mainly caused by 
structural factors, a rapid unwinding becomes 
less likely. 
Against this background, the widening of 
current account positions cannot be entirely 
explained by changes in the structure of the 
global economy. Cyclical factors, sometimes 
associated with economic policies, have fuelled 
the underlying imbalances. If market participants 
start to question the sustainability of these 
policies and the associated economic outcome, 
an overshooting can happen and a disorderly 
unwinding of global economic imbalances is 
possible.
Both sets of factors thus contribute to global 
imbalances, though their degree of permanence 
is quite distinct. Although they are conceptually 
separate, they are often highly interdependent. 
This implies that none of the presented theories 
provides by itself a satisfactory, self-contained 
explanation of global imbalances. It is therefore 
important to consider the factors as being not 
mutually exclusive but inter-reliant.
4.1 STRUCTURAL  FACTORS
It is important that a broad view be taken of 
global imbalances. In the policy discussion, 
global imbalances have so far been a synonym 
for the widening current account deﬁ  cit in the 
United States and the corresponding current 
account surpluses in, particularly, emerging Asia 
and oil-exporting economies. From the ﬁ  nancial 
perspective, current account imbalances 
are by deﬁ   nition matched by corresponding 
capital  ﬂ   ows. As a result, global imbalances 
nowadays could equally well be described 
in terms of gradually increasing net capital 
ﬂ   ows from emerging economies to industrial 
Labelling the factors as short-run and long-run, highlighting  20 
thereby their different degrees of persistence, could be equally 
valid.29
ECB
Occasional Paper No 78
January 2008
4   STRUCTURAL AND 
CYCLICAL FACTORS countries. In what follows, we demonstrate that 
a characteristic of global imbalances is indeed 
this counterintuitive direction of global capital 
ﬂ  ows. Furthermore, we will argue that not only 
the direction but also the composition of global 
capital ﬂ  ows provides some interesting insight 
into this new wave of ﬁ  nancial globalisation. In 
light of these stylised facts, we will discuss the 
relationship between institutions, incomplete 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation and the emergence of 
global imbalances. Finally, we also provide some 
intuition as to why improving macroeconomic 
management could have been a factor behind 
widening current account deﬁ  cits.
4.1.1 A VIEW OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES FROM THE 
FINANCIAL ANGLE
While global cross-border capital ﬂ  ows  have 
risen to unprecedented levels in the recent 
years, only a small fraction reaches developing 
countries. The observed counterintuitive pattern 
in the data has been labelled in the literature as 
the “Lucas puzzle”. Lucas (1990) highlighted 
more than decade ago the weaknesses of 
standard neoclassical growth models in 
explaining the behaviour of international capital 
ﬂ  ows. Such models predict that countries with a 
lower capital/labour ratio should have a higher 
marginal return to capital, so that international 
capital should ﬂ  ow from rich to poor countries.
In recent years, the average relative per capita 
income of capital-exporting countries has 
been trending downward (Charts 12 and 13). 
Correspondingly, there has been an upward 
trend in the relative income level of the group 
of countries with current account deﬁ  cits. 
Using Lucas’ terminology, capital has started 
to ﬂ  ow from poor to rich countries or “uphill”. 
Interestingly, in policy circles the threat to global 
ﬁ  nancial stability is perceived to be greater than 
in previous episodes of ﬁ  nancial globalisation, 
when capital was ﬂ  owing “downhill” or mainly 
between developed economies, leading to 
the conclusion that the global economy is in 
imbalance. 
Lucas’s original explanation of subdued capital 
ﬂ  ows to emerging economies was the overall 
lack of productivity catch-up in developing 
countries resulting from domestic distortions in 
the return to capital. Explanations of the Lucas 
paradox have relied on the notion that risk-
adjusted returns to capital investment may not 
be as high in poor countries as suggested by their 
low capital/labour ratios. The latter can be the 
Chart 12 Net capital flows to middle and 
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result of weak institutions (Alfaro et al. 2005), 
costly physical capital (Hsieh and Kelnow, 
2003) or repeated defaults on government 
debt (Gertler and Rogoff, 2000). As a result, 
international capital does not ﬂ  ow with the same 
magnitude towards poor countries as originally 
predicted by the neoclassical model. Of course, 
the above stylised facts are not inconsistent with 
Lucas’s original explanation. One could argue 
that capital ﬂ  ows from poor to rich countries 
because the risk-adjusted returns to capital are 
simply higher in high-income countries.
However, the allocation of capital within 
emerging economies appears to be distorted. 
Chart 14 illustrates a stylised fact that is 
inconsistent with Lucas’s original explanation. 
It demonstrates that the average ratio of net 
capital inﬂ  ows to GDP between 1980 and 2006 
seems, if anything, to be negatively correlated 
with the investment-to-GDP ratio in emerging 
economies. However, if investment and capital 
ﬂ  ows were primarily driven by changes in risk-
adjusted returns to capital, countries that invest 
more should receive more capital. Gourinchas 
and Jeanne (2006) labelled the observed pattern 
the “capital allocation puzzle”.21
Interestingly, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
ﬂ   ows behave more in accordance with the 
standard model. It is possible that capital ﬂ  ows 
between developed and developing countries 
are increasingly dominated by aid ﬂ  ows or the 
accumulation of foreign reserves.
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) argue 
therefore that a proper indication whether the 
benchmark neoclassical model is able to replicate 
the data is given by examining FDI ﬂ  ows. 
Chart 15 demonstrates that FDI ﬂ  ows indeed 
behave more in accordance with the standard 
neoclassical model. The weighted average 
relative incomes of countries experiencing net 
FDI inﬂ   ows are generally lower that that of 
FDI- exporting countries. As a result, the data 
indicates that ﬁ  nancial  capital  ﬂ  ows  “uphill”, 
while FDI tends to ﬂ  ow “downhill”.
The stylised facts presented so far are striking. 
First, capital tends to ﬂ   ow from emerging 
to developed economies. Second, even 
capital  ﬂ   ows to emerging economies tend 
to be allocated to countries with relatively 
low investment-to-GDP ratios, although 
Furthermore, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) show that  21 
developing countries that have relied more on foreign ﬁ  nance 
have not grown faster than comparable countries with a net 
capital outﬂ  ow. If, however, capital ﬂ  ows to emerging markets 
were primarily driven by changes in risk-adjusted returns to 
capital, countries with higher capital ﬂ  ows should also experience 
higher growth rates.
Chart 14 Average capital inflows and 
investment rates in emerging economies 
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CYCLICAL FACTORS there should be an unambiguously negative 
relationship between investment and the current 
account if foreign inﬂ   ows respond largely to 
investment opportunities. The fact that the 
relationship is positive provides a hint that the 
allocation of domestic savings is the driving 
force behind these results. In particular, as we 
will argue later, the effectiveness of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation might be an important 
determinant of international capital ﬂ  ows.
What are possible explanations for these 
stylised facts? In what follows, we highlight the 
importance of structural factors in explaining the 
pattern of international capital ﬂ  ows and global 
imbalances. In particular, we will highlight the 
role of:
(i)  global economic and ﬁ  nancial integration;
(ii) incomplete  ﬁ  nancial  globalisation,22 
emphasising the role of institutions; and
(iii)  improved macroeconomic management 
and the corresponding business cycle 
moderation in the United States. 
4.1.2 GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION 
Although global economic integration has 
grown rapidly, ﬁ   nancial globalisation has 
been unbalanced and incomplete. Financial 
market imperfections can have an impact 
on the direction of net capital ﬂ   ows and the 
corresponding composition of gross ﬂ  ows 
through several channels. For example, 
regional ﬁ  nancial imperfections can result in an 
insufﬁ  cient supply of “safe” assets in the world 
and trigger net capital ﬂ  ows to regions where 
safe assets are produced. Financial imperfections 
can also induce diverging patterns of relative 
domestic savings between economies with a low 
level of ﬁ  nancial development and economies 
with functioning and deep ﬁ  nancial  markets 
due to different capacities to provide insurance 
against future risk. A prerequisite for all these 
developments is, however, the existence of 
global economic and ﬁ  nancial integration.
The rise in trade openness has been signiﬁ  cant 
in both industrial and emerging economies. 
Cross-border trade ﬂ   ows have increased very 
markedly in the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1970s 
the sum of exports and imports stood around 
25% of GDP in industrial economies; this 
number has been over 40% since the early 
2000s (Chart 16). Even more impressive is the 
increase in trade openness in emerging market 
economies. Exports and imports have grown 
from 15% to almost 60% percent of GDP. 
Particularly, the share of emerging Asia in 
world exports has been steadily increasing. 
Exports from emerging Asia rose from 8% of 
total world exports in 1980 to over 20% in 2005, 
overtaking the United States, the euro area and 
Japan as the most important export region. The 
rise in exports in emerging Asia is driven not 
only by developments in China but also by the 
acceleration of intra-regional export dynamics 
in South-East and North-East Asia (Chart 17).
Financial capital ﬂ   ows have also recorded a 
rapid increase in recent years. The sum of stocks 
of external assets and liabilities as a percentage 
of GDP, an indicator of ﬁ  nancial  openness, 
has followed an upward trend. In industrial 
economies, it stood at around 120% of GDP 
in 2005, compared with 20% in the 1970s. 
See Bini Smaghi (2007) for a discussion on the relationship  22 
between incomplete ﬁ  nancial globalisation, global imbalances 
and national monetary policies.
Chart 16 Trade openness (sum of exports 
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In emerging economies, the stock of external 
assets and liabilities has doubled as a percentage 
of GDP in the last ten years, reaching over 40% 
in 2005 (Chart 18).
The wave of global economic integration has 
been viewed as an engine for global growth. 
Rising cross-border trade and ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows 
were further spurred by the liberalisation of 
capital controls in anticipation of the beneﬁ  ts 
that cross-border ﬂ   ows would bring in terms 
of global allocation of capital and improved 
international risk-sharing possibilities. The 
strong presumption was that these beneﬁ  ts ought 
to be large, especially for developing countries 
that tend to be relatively capital-poor and have 
more volatile income growth.
However, widening current account positions 
will only reﬂ  ect  efﬁ   cient allocation of global 
capital if relative prices between regions are not 
distorted. Widening current account positions in 
the world could be partly a natural consequence 
of global economic and ﬁ  nancial  integration. 
Globalisation allows investment to be steered 
towards the projects with the highest returns and 
technology to be transferred to less developed 
economies. This dampens the complementary 
relationship between domestic investment 
and savings, leading to stronger variations in 
current account positions across countries. 
Furthermore,  ﬁ   nancial integration allows 
improved diversiﬁ  cation of risks, contributing 
thereby also to a welfare-improving and more 
efﬁ  cient allocation of capital. This benign view 
of global imbalances relies, however, on the 
assumption that relative prices (for example 
nominal and real exchange rates) in the world 
are not distorted.
The widening current account positions resulting 
from the rise in oil-prices can be rationalized by 
the desire of oil-exporting countries to smooth 
consumption intertemporally. While recent oil-
price hikes have been a ﬁ  llip for income growth 
in oil-exporting countries, it is unlikely that this 
trend will persist forever.23 Financial 
globalization, however, allows oil-exporters to 
smooth consumption intertemporally. The latter 
jointly with the lack of domestic investment 
opportunities, particularly in GCC countries, 
provides a rational for capital outﬂ  ows from oil-
exporting countries, and widening current 
account positions in the world. 
Even if oil prices remain high in the future, substitution effects  23 
will potentially result in a decrease in the actual income of oil 
exporters in the long run.
Chart 17 Shares in world exports








































Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook and ECB calculations.
Chart 18 Financial openness
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Global economic and ﬁ  nancial  integration 
can, therefore, partly explain the increase in 
cross-border capital ﬂ   ows but not the rise in 
net capital outﬂ  ows from emerging Asia. The 
increase in international capital ﬂ   ows can be 
partly explained by the reduction of cross-
border capital controls and increasing ﬁ  nancial 
development and integration. However, 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation fails to elucidate the 
counterintuitive direction of net capital ﬂ  ows in 
recent years. We will turn to this issue next.
4.1.3 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT
Domestic institutions and the degree of 
ﬁ  nancial development in a country play a role 
in determining not only the magnitude of gross 
capital ﬂ  ows but in particular the direction of net 
ﬂ  ows. For example, a weak domestic ﬁ  nancial 
sector could translate a sustained increase in 
productivity into an increase in savings growth 
that bypasses the domestic ﬁ  nancial system and 
triggers net ﬁ  nancial  outﬂ   ows. If a ﬁ  nancial 
sector is well developed, a permanent increase 
in productivity would result in an increase in 
consumption as consumers borrow to consume in 
anticipation of their higher income. If, however, 
there are borrowing constraints as a result of a 
negative external shock, savings might increase 
following a permanent rise in productivity. 
Jappelli and Pagano (1999) demonstrate the 
possibility of a positive correlation between 
savings and growth with ﬁ  nancial  market 
imperfection. As argued by Ju and Wei (2006), 
if the domestic ﬁ   nancial sector is inefﬁ  cient, 
the increase in domestic savings will bypass it, 
resulting in an outﬂ  ow of ﬁ  nancial capital.
The “bypass” effect in emerging economies 
can explain why FDI ﬂ   ows “downhill” and 
ﬁ   nancial capital tends to ﬂ   ow “uphill”. If a 
country has an underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial sector 
but an intermediate level of property rights, it 
is likely to be simultaneously a net exporter of 
ﬁ  nancial capital and a net importer of FDI. The 
composition of gross ﬂ  ows depends therefore 
on the relative strength of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
and property rights protection. In other words, 
the failure of domestic ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
provides an explanation for the observed 
composition of capital ﬂ  ows.
There are several stylised facts that underline 
the empirical signiﬁ  cance of the bypass effect. 
Using stock data on foreign asset positions 
for 80 industrial and emerging economies, Daude 
and Fratzscher (2006) demonstrate the empirical 
signiﬁ  cance of the bypass effect. In Chart 20, 
we summarise their results. Note that the group 
of countries are organised into quintiles, where 
a higher quintile indicates a higher value of the 
variable of interest, and corresponding capital 
stocks are presented as percentage shares of 
total capital stocks. The stylised facts presented 
in the ﬁ   gures below are striking. First, rich 
countries appear to receive more foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) than poor countries. Second, 
higher GDP volatility implies higher FDI. 
Third, mature ﬁ  nancial markets (represented by 
the ratio of credit to GDP in the economy) are 
associated with high foreign portfolio investment 
and limited FDI ﬂ  ows. Fourth, worse institutions 
(measured by a corruption index) go hand in hand 
with relatively higher FDI ﬂ  ows compared with 
foreign portfolio investment. 
Chart 19 Oil exporters’ combined current 
accounts
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4.1.4 FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS AND 
PRECAUTIONARY SAVINGS 
Capital market liberalisation/integration may 
generate net capital ﬂ   ows only because 
countries are vastly different in their levels of 
ﬁ  nancial development and institutional quality. 
Economies with more developed ﬁ  nancial markets 
can potentially accumulate foreign liabilities vis-à-
vis countries with less developed ﬁ  nancial systems 
in a gradual, long-lasting process, despite higher 
capital-to-labour ratios. Mendoza, Quadrini and 
Rios-Rull (2006) show that even if all countries 
have identical preferences, resources and 
production technologies, differences in ﬁ  nancial 
characteristics across countries result in net capital 
ﬂ  ows. Increasing ﬁ  nancial integration with the rest 
of the world can lead to a reduction in US savings 
and an increase in the foreign demand for US 
assets as a result of the speciﬁ  c characteristics of 
the US ﬁ  nancial system. Dorucci and Brutti (2007) 
also highlight the role of ﬁ  nancial imperfections in 
explaining the asymmetric responses of regional 
savings rates to global growth. Ferrucci and 
Miralles (2007) provide empirical support for the 
latter hypothesis.
Financial systems that are developed and well-
functioning result in deeper ﬁ  nancial markets, 
allowing lower domestic savings. First, countries 
with deeper ﬁ  nancial markets tend to have lower 
savings and accumulate net foreign liabilities. 
Conversely, countries with shallow ﬁ  nancial 
markets, and therefore high ﬁ  nancial  market 
volatility, may have higher savings (owing to 
the lack of insurance, for example) but higher 
capital outﬂ  ows (resulting from a desire to seek 
more secure returns). Second, ﬁ  nancial  market 
differences also affect the composition of the 
international portfolio. Countries with deeper 
ﬁ  nancial markets can invest in high-return assets. 
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As a result, they may receive positive factor 
payments even if their net foreign asset position is 
negative. Low-income countries with low levels 
of  ﬁ   nancial development will be worse off in 
such an environment because their savings may 
bypass their domestic ﬁ   nancial sector and ﬂ  ow 
to developed countries with highly sophisticated 
ﬁ  nancial markets, at least in the short run. Financial 
imperfections can have therefore increase savings 
and the demand for (safe) assets. 
Financial imperfections can also capture a 
country’s inability to supply assets. Caballero 
et al. (2006) emphasise the importance of ﬁ  nancial 
imperfections for global imbalances. Financial 
imperfections are deﬁ  ned as a country’s inability to 
supply assets in a world without uncertainty. If there 
is an increasing demand for a “store of value” at 
the global level, but safe assets are not provided in 
every single region in the world, one should observe 
capital ﬂ  ows to regions that are able to produce the 
desired assets. Consider a situation where some 
regions that are good asset suppliers experience a 
sustained growth slowdown (continental western 
Europe and Japan in the early 1990s, for example), 
or where the quality or acceptance of ﬁ  nancial 
assets deteriorates (emerging Asia and Russia after 
the Asian crisis). In both cases, the global supply 
of ﬁ  nancial assets declines. This depresses global 
interest rates, generates persistent capital ﬂ  ows to 
the United States and an offsetting current account 
deﬁ  cit. The global decline in the supply of ﬁ  nancial 
assets also increases the value of US ﬁ  nancial 
assets, which could be a ﬁ  llip for US wealth and 
consumption growth, leading thereby to a current 
account deﬁ  cit.
Why does capital ﬂ  ow from emerging markets 
mainly to the United States and will this ﬂ  ow be 
sustained forever? The argument that ﬁ  nancial 
capital  ﬂ   ows from emerging markets to 
developed economies as a result of ﬁ  nancial 
market imperfections might be compelling, but 
it does not explain by itself the predominant role 
of the United States as a beneﬁ   ciary of this 
“exorbitant privilege”. However, there are 
several explanations for the exceptional role of 
the United States as the “world’s banker”. First, 
although most industrial economies are 
increasingly  ﬁ   nancially open, they still lag 
behind the United States with regard to ﬁ  nancial 
development (see Charts 21, 22 and 23).24
Second, Europe and Japan have experienced a 
prolonged episode of subdued economic growth 
with corresponding negative spillovers to 
In fact, while industrial economies and emerging markets have  24 
made substantial progress in the area of ﬁ  nancial development 
in recent years, the relative gap to the United States has not 
narrowed signiﬁ  cantly (see also Chart 22). This, together with 
the growing level of income in emerging markets, can also 
explain the increase in capital ﬂ  ows into the United States.
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regional  ﬁ   nancial markets. The comparative 
advantage of the United States in generating 
ﬁ  nancial assets is, however, not eternally given 
and cannot be considered as being exogenous. 
In fact, policy failures could lead to a questioning 
of the exceptional position of the United States 
as host of ﬂ  ights to quality. 
4.1.5 BUSINESS CYCLE MODERATION, ECONOMIC 
POLICIES AND PRECAUTIONARY SAVINGS
External imbalances can also be the result 
of a decline in business cycle volatility and 
a corresponding reduction of precautionary 
savings. Chart 24 illustrates the close co-
movement between an estimate of conditional 
volatility of US real GDP growth (estimated 
by a GARCH (1,1) model) and US external 
imbalances. It also conﬁ  rms the result of Stock 
and Watson (2002) that since the 1980s the 
decline in US business cycle volatility has been 
very signiﬁ  cant. There are several explanations 
in the literature for the “great moderation”; the 
most frequently cited reason is the improved 
conduct of US monetary policy (see Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler, 2000). However, how can 
these results explain widening current account 
positions in the world? 
If a country experiences a fall in business cycle 
volatility greater than that of its partners, its 
relative incentive to accumulate precautionary 
savings declines, resulting (all other things being 
equal) in a permanent savings and investment 
imbalance, and a corresponding deterioration in 
its external balance. External imbalances could 
be, therefore, a by-product of the great 
moderation in US business cycle volatility. 
Fogli and Perri (2006) assess how much of the 
current US imbalance can be explained by this 
channel. They suggest that a fall in business 
cycle volatility such as that observed for the 
United States relative to other major economies 
can account for about 20% of the current total 
US external imbalance.25
The increase in risk aversion in Asia has 
ampliﬁ   ed the process. The growth in 
international reserves in recent years, especially 
in Asia, has generated a debate on the optimal 
level of reserves for emerging market countries 
and on the reasons behind this trend. Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2006) argue that reserves have been 
accumulated as an insurance against the risk of 
balance-of-payments crises, which came to be 
perceived as higher after the 1997-98 South-
East Asian crises. In other words, the continuing 
accumulation of international reserves, or stock 
of precautionary savings, is an indication of 
an increase in risk aversion in Asia. Both the 
decline in US business cycle volatility and the 
rise in precautionary savings in Asia, combined 
Output volatility may have fallen in other industrial economies  25 
as well, but the combination of reduced volatility with the more 
advanced stage of ﬁ  nancial development in the United States 
may explain why the US current account deﬁ  cit has been more 
strongly affected.
Chart 23 Financial openness index
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CYCLICAL FACTORS with the insufﬁ  cient supply of safe assets in the 
world, may be additional explanations of why 
ﬁ  nancial capital ﬂ  ows “uphill”.
A change in demographics can also have 
a signiﬁ   cant impact on current account 
developments in the world. As households 
generally prefer a smooth consumption pattern, 
but income follows a hump-shaped proﬁ  le, 
an altering age structure has an impact on the 
savings decisions of individuals. Demographic 
transitions towards a society with a higher elderly 
dependence ratio initially increases household 
savings as it reduces the number of young 
dependents and increases the number of working 
adults, but eventually reduces savings as a larger 
portion of population retires and reaches old age. 
The net effect on the saving/investment balance 
tends therefore to vary during the different stages 
of demographic transition.
There are several other structural factors that 
could explain high global savings. One of the 
most prominent is the low level of public goods 
provision by governments in Asia. The near-
absence of social security and the associated 
high uncertainty about future developments fuels 
Asia’s precautionary savings rate. Furthermore, 
continuous deleveraging of corporate sector 
balance sheets, not only in emerging economies 
but also in the industrial world, has contributed 
to the global savings glut. A signiﬁ  cant  part 
of savings growth in Asia also reﬂ  ects foreign 
exchange market interventions, associated with 
ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes, as for example in 
China, or managed exchange rate regimes, as in 
other parts of emerging Asia. This does not only 
result in savings/investment imbalances but also 
distorts international relative price developments, 
leading potentially to suboptimal allocation of 
capital as we have discussed above. 
While there is a consensus that ﬁ  xed exchange 
rate regimes can trigger distortions in global 
trade ﬂ  ows, the literature is inconclusive about 
the importance of the exchange rate for the 
emergence and/or the unwinding of global 
imbalances. Fixed/managed exchange rate 
regimes and the corresponding impact on 
international relative prices can trigger structural 
distortions in international trade and ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows. However, there is a lack of consensus in 
the empirical literature as to how much of the 
present US current account deﬁ   cit is a result 
of this. As we will discuss at a later stage, 
Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007) highlight 
instead the importance of asset prices for the 
emergence of the US current account deﬁ  cit. 
Bems, Dedola and Smets (2006) argue that the 
important role of productivity improvements and 
ﬁ  scal and monetary policy easing have helped to 
increase the US external deﬁ  cit since 2000. There 
is also a lack of agreement with regard to the role 
of the exchange rate in the resolution of global 
imbalances. In a series of inﬂ  uential  papers, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2005 and 2006) 
argue that a closing of the US current account 
deﬁ  cit through the exchange rate channel would 
imply a large fall in the external value of the US 
dollar. Their result is, however, subject to two 
important caveats that tend to bias upwards the 
required depreciation. First, implied changes are 
derived under the assumption of the exchange 
rate being the only available adjustment factor. 
Second, theoretical models of the current account 
are by construction highly stylised and rely on a 
number of assumptions both on the structure of 
the economy and on the size of certain economic 
relationships which may be unrealistic. Engler, 
Fidora and Thimann (2007), for example, 
highlight the importance of an endogenous 
supply-side response for the analysis - a feature 
that is missing in the Obstfeld-Rogoff framework 
- and show that the latter signiﬁ  cantly reduces the 
need for a large exchange rate change to narrow 
the current account gap. In a similar vein, Bems 
and Dedola (2007) show that including valuation 
effects resulting from ﬂ  uctuations in gross asset 
and liability positions in the Obstfeld-Rogoff 
framework can also substantially attenuate the 
need for a large exchange rate adjustment. 
4.2 CYCLICAL  FACTORS
In this section, we discuss some further factors 
that have potentially contributed to the widening 
current account positions in the world. We label 38
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the factors discussed in this section as “cyclical” 
or “macroeconomic policy-induced”. There are 
several factors that ﬁ  t well under this umbrella. 
Focusing in what follows mainly on developments 
in the United States, we ﬁ  nd it helpful to separate 
the arguments into (i) those relating to factors that 
have had a potentially cyclical impact on private 
sector aggregate demand and (ii) those relating to 
factors that have affected public sector aggregate 
demand. As most of the arguments are extensive-
ly discussed in the “traditional” literature on the 
determinants of current account deﬁ  cits, we will 
keep the analysis concise.
4.2.1 PRIVATE SECTOR SAVINGS/INVESTMENT 
IMBALANCES
Widening current account deﬁ   cits in the 
United States have been accompanied by a 
fall in household net savings. Since the 1990s 
developments in the current account have been 
closely mirrored by ﬂ   uctuations in household 
net savings. However, not only the recent US 
experience (see Chart 25) but also international 
evidence points to a close relationship between 
household net savings and the external position of 
a country. In Chart 26 we plot data for economies 
belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to illustrate 
the positive relationship between average current 
account balances and average household net 
savings between 2001 and 2005. 
The fall in US household net savings is reﬂ  ected 
in the rise in private consumption. Until the 
end of 2006 the dynamics of US GDP growth 
were dominated by private consumption and 
residential investment (see Chart 28). US 
personal consumption rose from 67% of GDP in 
1999 to 70% in 2005. A similar sharp increase 
has been observed in residential investment.
The rise in US private consumption has been 
one of the triggers for the observed unbalanced 
path of global demand. The dynamics of US 
real GDP have been the main engine for global 
Chart 25 US household and current account 
balances 
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growth in recent years. Since 2002 US real 
GDP growth has been on average 200 basis 
points higher than growth in the euro area or in 
Japan (see Chart 27). US real GDP growth has 
been driven mainly by a sharp and persistent 
acceleration of private consumption, while net 
exports have recorded a negative contribution 
to GDP growth on average. At the same time, 
private consumption growth in other industrial 
economies has been subdued. 
What are the factors behind the acceleration of 
US private consumption? There are several 
factors which could have triggered a boost in 
US consumption.26 In what follows, we highlight 
the role of two factors that have been widely 
discussed in policy circles. In particular: 
(i)  an increase in US permanent income due 
to a persistent positive productivity shock; 
and
(ii)  the rise in household wealth reﬂ  ecting the 
surge in asset prices. 
The two factors have fundamentally different 
implications for widening current account 
deﬁ   cits. While productivity-driven changes in 
permanent income would imply that current 
account imbalances are an equilibrium response 
on the part of rational agents to changes in the 
economic environment, US consumption growth 
driven by ﬂ  uctuations in asset prices could give 
a rise to a boom-bust cycle. As the current 
account is usually a countercyclical variable, a 
revision of consumer and investor expectations 
and a corresponding drop in asset prices could 
trigger a sudden unwinding of the US current 
account deﬁ  cit. 
See also the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Annual  26 
Report 2007 for a comprehensive analysis of factors behind 
changes in propensity to consume in the United States.
Chart 28 Contributions to US real GDP growth
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Productivity differentials  27
Productivity differentials between the United 
States and the rest of the world are one of the 
possible explanations for the observed widening 
of current account deﬁ  cits. From the theoretical 
perspective a country-speciﬁ  c  permanent 
increase in productivity  28 justiﬁ  es a rise in the 
current account deﬁ  cit, as it raises the permanent 
income of households. Several studies have 
shown the signiﬁ  cance of productivity shocks in 
explaining current account positions. Glick and 
Rogoff (1995) demonstrate, for example, that a 
1% increase in US productivity relative to 
productivity abroad decreases the current 
account balance by 0.15 percentage point of 
GDP. In fact, a 1% increase in investment 
triggered by a productivity shock tends to induce 
a widening of a current account deﬁ  cit  by 
0.33 percentage point of GDP.29 
Productivity differentials between tradable and 
non-tradable sectors might have also triggered 
a widening of the US current account deﬁ  cit. 
According to Gordon (2004), over 50% of the 
US/Europe productivity differential over the 
past decade is due to retailing, with another 
25% due to wholesale. In theory, a productivity 
shock in the non-tradable sector could have an 
impact on current account via the following 
channel. First, households have preferences as 
regards the distribution of a consumption basket 
between traded and non-traded goods, but also 
face a choice in the allocation of consumption 
over time. When households have a high 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution but a low 
elasticity between traded and non-traded goods, 
they are less concerned about ﬂ  uctuations  in 
consumption over time and more concerned 
about the distribution of consumption between 
goods. So if the supply of non-traded goods 
rises as a result of a rise in productivity in the 
non-tradable production sector, households will 
still wish to consume a balanced basket of goods 
and therefore increase imports of traded goods 
resulting in a trade balance deﬁ  cit. This implies 
a sharp increase in current consumption and a 
decline in future consumption when households 
pay back their external debt.
The signiﬁ   cance of productivity differentials 
in explaining the widening of the US current 
account deﬁ  cit is, however, disputed. First, the 
estimated productivity differentials between the 
United States and Europe appear to be too small 
to plausibly drive the widening of the US current 
account deﬁ  cit. Second, in theory productivity 
differentials should lead to a current account 
deﬁ  cit being ﬁ  nanced by foreign private capital 
inﬂ  ows. Looking at the data, however, a large 
fraction of net capital ﬂ   ows into the United 
States reﬂ  ect purchases of US assets by foreign 
central banks, especially from emerging Asia 
and oil-exporting countries. Third, it is difﬁ  cult 
to argue that productivity growth in the United 
States has been signiﬁ   cantly higher than in 
emerging Asia, the main counterpart of the US 
trade deﬁ  cit.
Asset prices and household wealth
At the aggregate level, the effect of wealth on 
consumption has been a mainstay of large-scale.
econometric models. Econometric speciﬁ  cations 
of aggregate consumption such as that included 
in the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model 
generally show that an additional dollar of stock 
market wealth raises the level of consumer 
spending by 3 to 5 cents, with the effect 
emerging gradually over several years. 
Some other studies estimate an even greater 
impact of changes in wealth on consumption. 
Juster, Lupton, Smith and Stafford (2004), 
One can certainly argue about whether productivity differentials  27 
should be listed as a cyclical factor in the chosen framework. 
Note, however, that in the empirical macroeconomic literature 
shocks to productivity are one of the key drivers of business cycle 
ﬂ   uctuations. Furthermore, households sometimes mistakenly 
interpret temporary productivity shocks as permanent shocks, 
triggering thereby cyclical ﬂ  uctuations in consumption and the 
current account. The fact that long-run trends in productivity 
differentials are determined by structural factors is, however, 
acknowledged.
Temporary shocks should actually lead to a current account  28 
surplus. 
This is a puzzle, since in the standard open-economy models a  29 
permanent country-speciﬁ  c productivity shock will induce a rise 
in the current account deﬁ  cit in excess of the corresponding rise 
in investment. Because it takes time for the capital stock to adjust, 
permanent income rises by more than current income following 
a productivity shock, implying a fall in domestic savings and a 
signiﬁ  cant deterioration in the current account.41
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examining the relationship between changes in 
“active” savings and capital gains over a period 
of  ﬁ   ve years, estimate a surprisingly large 
marginal propensity of consumption of 17 cents 
out of each dollar of additional stock market 
wealth. The results of Dynan and Maki (2001) 
indicate that for households with different levels 
of security holdings, the marginal propensity of 
consumption out of wealth is between 5 cents 
and 15 cents, with the most likely gain in the 
lower part of this range. Because this response 
is larger than most aggregate estimates, the 
authors argue that households with high levels of 
securities holdings may have a smaller response 
to wealth gains. 
How much do housing values boost the wealth 
effect and consumer spending relative to 
equities? Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek (2006) 
argue that an increase in housing wealth of 
USD 100 could eventually boosts spending by 
USD 9, while a similar increase in stock market 
wealth produces only USD 4 more spending. 
This is because homes are, for most families, 
their single biggest asset. Note that distribution 
differs considerably between housing and stock 
market wealth. According to the Federal Reserve 
System, 68.5% of Americans live in their own 
homes, while stock market participation is just 
under 50%. Only a small percentage of a typical 
family’s net worth is invested in equities.30
Indeed, in most cases, equities are only their 
second or third largest asset. The signiﬁ  cant rise 
in home prices (which doubled between the late 
1990s and the early 2000s) was also driven by 
the appearance of new ﬁ  nancial  instruments 
such as the mortgage equity withdrawal that 
accompanied these asset price rises over the last 
few years. 
Empirically,  ﬂ   uctuations in asset prices seem 
to be very important for the current account. 
Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007) have 
shown that a 10% relative increase in equity or 
household wealth in the United States could lead 
to a deterioration in the trade balance by 1%. 
Variance decomposition analysis also indicates 
that wealth effects, related to asset market 
shocks and not exchange rate shocks, appear to 
be the main drivers of the US current account 
deﬁ  cit. The close co-movement between asset 
prices and current accounts is indeed striking. 
Data on OECD countries illustrate a negative 
relationship between the change in house 
prices and the current account (see Chart 29). 
Moreover, the evolution of current account 
imbalances in the world is closely tracked by the 
movement in US equity prices (see Chart 30).
What are the factors behind the rise in US asset 
markets? The empirical literature points towards 
a strong relationship between asset prices and US 
See also Vansteenkiste (2007) for an analysis on the impact of  30 
regional housing markets in the United States on macroeconomic 
aggregates.
Chart 29 House prices and current account
(average change 1997-2005)
x-axis: change in nominal house price change
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interest rates. Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello 
and Minetti (2003) provide Value-at-Risk 
(VAR) evidence indicating a positive response 
of real house prices to expansionary interest rate 
shocks. A recent study by the Federal Reserve 
Board (Ahearne et al., 2005) considers cross-
country evidence and ﬁ  nds a consistent pattern 
of low interest rates preceding a house-price 
peak. Similar ﬁ  ndings are presented in a BIS 
study by Borio and McGuire (2004). Therefore, 
loose monetary policy, particularly in the 
United States (see Chart 31), might have played 
a signiﬁ  cant role in triggering asset price booms 
in recent years.
4.2.2 PUBLIC SECTOR SAVINGS/INVESTMENT 
IMBALANCES
The “twin deﬁ  cit” proposition, which says that 
ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cits are a main driving force behind 
current account deﬁ  cits, has been at the centre 
of policy discussions ever since the Reagan 
tax cuts in the 1980s. The reason why the twin 
deﬁ  cit hypothesis has become popular lies in the 
fact that the US budget deﬁ  cit and trade balance 
moved closely together in the mid-1980s, a 
period characterised by large ﬁ  scal imbalances. 
In the late 1990s, however, the two time 
series show a remarkable divergence, leading 
sometimes to the premature conclusion that the 
twin deﬁ  cit hypothesis is disproved by the data 
(see Chart 32). The analysis of the unconditional 
correlation might, however, be misleading as it 
fails to take into account the cyclical nature of 
ﬁ  scal and trade balances. Following both supply 
and demand-side shocks the trade balance is 
generally found to be countercyclical, while an 
economic boom will improve the ﬁ  scal balance. 
As a result, a negative correlation between 
trade balance and ﬁ  scal stance at business cycle 
frequencies might provide us with a distorted 
picture of the true effects of ﬁ  scal policy on the 
trade balance.
A large body of literature has focused on 
identifying the impact of ﬁ   scal policy on 
the current account balance. While there is 
Chart 32 US government net lending and 
current account balance
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effects, most studies argue that that there is a 
negative relationship between a ﬁ  scal  deﬁ  cit 
and the trade balance. Chinn and Prasad (2003) 
and Gruber and Kamin (2005) ﬁ  nd, however, a 
very low elasticity of the trade balance to a ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cit. Bussière, Fratzscher and Müller (2005) 
also report a modest negative impact of a ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cit on the current account. Interestingly, Kim 
and Roubini (2003) ﬁ  nd that a negative shock to 
the ﬁ  scal balance has a positive impact on the 
current account in the United States, providing 
evidence for a “twin divergence” hypothesis. 
The unconditional correlation between ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ   cits and current account balances in the 
OECD also indicate a negative relationship 
between the variables (see Chart 33). 
Some model-based studies also suggest a limited 
response of the trade balance to changes in ﬁ  scal 
policy. For example, Erceg et al. (2005) ﬁ  nd that 
a 1% increase in a ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cit increases the 
current account deﬁ  cit by 0.20%. The assumed 
intratemporal elasticity between foreign and 
domestic goods in the model is, however, 
relatively low compared with that suggested by 
the empirical literature. Models with strong non-
Ricardian features, where a rise in government 
spending implies a domestic demand multiplier 
larger than one, and a direct link between 
government debt and net foreign asset positions, 
such as for example the IMF’s GEM, predict a 
much stronger impact of ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cits on the 
trade balance (see Faruqee et al, 2006a).
However, even if the immediate impact of ﬁ  scal 
policy on the trade balance is limited, budget 
deﬁ  cits might jeopardise a country’s ability to 
meet its future obligations. In theory, the limited 
response of the trade balance to changes in 
the ﬁ  scal stance is usually driven by a fall in 
investment. However, this lowers the potential 
growth rate in the economy, jeopardising thereby 
the ability of the country to repay its future 
obligations (see Corsetti and Müller, 2006). 44
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5 CONCLUSION
This paper has taken a bird’s eye view of the 
phenomenon of global imbalances. If nothing 
else, it has shown that these imbalances are 
a complex phenomenon. Global imbalances 
cannot be reduced to a large current account 
deﬁ   cit in one country, the United States. 
Instead, they are a manifestation of a number of 
factors that are the salient features of the global 
economy of the early twenty-ﬁ  rst century: the 
economic and political rise of new emerging 
giants, an unprecedented wave of ﬁ  nancial 
integration, and long-lasting pressures on the 
price of energy resources and commodities. 
How should we think about these imbalances? 
Are they exceptional in a long-run historical 
context? What fundamental factors explain 
them? These are some of the questions this 
paper has aimed to address.
The paper started with a deﬁ   nition of global 
imbalances: external positions of systemically 
important economies that reﬂ  ect distortions or 
entail risks for the global economy. We propose 
this deﬁ  nition because it has three components 
that are essential to understanding the 
imbalances. First of all, our deﬁ  nition refers to 
external positions and thereby encompasses not 
only current account positions but, in particular, 
also ﬁ  nancial positions. This is crucial because 
international ﬁ  nancial integration is more than 
just the mirror image of trade integration (in 
fact, the international investment positions of 
several countries, predominantly the United 
states, do not reﬂ   ect their cumulated current 
account balances owing to valuation effects). 
Second, the deﬁ   nition refers to systemically 
important economies and includes both the 
deﬁ  cit side (the United States) and the surplus 
side (Asia and oil exporters). Third, it refers to 
distortions and risks, which we offer as the main 
criterion for distinguishing imbalanced from 
balanced positions. 
We then proposed some measures of global 
imbalances and provided some perspective 
on the present phase of global imbalances in 
comparison with past episodes. A ﬁ  rst striking 
feature is that global imbalances are a recurrent 
theme in international economic history. The 
gold standard period preceding the First World 
War, the Bretton Woods period, the petrodollar 
recycling of the 1970s, the twin deﬁ  cits of the 
United States in the 1980s, and the wave of 
ﬁ  nancing  ﬂ   ows into emerging markets in the 
1990s all represent earlier episodes of large 
external imbalances. They were characterised 
by very different constellations (sometimes 
ﬂ   ows from industrial to emerging market 
economies, sometimes ﬂ  ows between industrial 
countries, sometimes between emerging market 
economies) and very different outcomes 
(sometimes orderly unwinding, sometimes 
unwinding through crisis). From this, one may 
be tempted to conclude that the present episode 
is just another repetition of history. This does 
not hold, however: we argue that three main 
features set today’s situation apart from past 
episodes of growing external imbalances: 
(i) the fact that capital ﬂ  ows from emerging new 
players (e.g. China and India) to the industrial 
world; (ii) an unprecedented wave of ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation, with more integrated global 
ﬁ  nancial markets and increasing opportunities 
for international portfolio diversiﬁ  cation;  and 
(iii) the favourable global macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial environment, with record high global 
growth rates, low ﬁ  nancial market volatility and 
easy global ﬁ  nancing conditions. 
Finally, we have argued that this increase 
in global imbalances has been driven by a 
unique combination of structural and cyclical 
determinants. Structural changes in the 
global economy have allowed a widening of 
external positions that may be sustainable 
in the medium term. Speciﬁ  cally,  ﬁ  nancial 
market imperfections in rapidly growing 
emerging economies have had an impact on the 
magnitude and on the direction of capital ﬂ  ows 
at the global level, with capital ﬂ  owing from 
emerging to industrial countries. The effects 
of  ﬁ   nancial market imperfections on capital 
ﬂ  ows are further ampliﬁ  ed by the differential 
impact of business cycle moderation and by 
the attractiveness of US ﬁ  nancial markets as a 
safe haven. Cyclical factors have further fuelled 45
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this structural process of widening external 
positions. These cyclical factors relate to saving/
investment patterns in the private sector (in the 
United States, for instance, accelerating private 
consumption due to a productivity-induced 
increase in US permanent income and due to 
wealth effects from rapid asset price increases) 
and the public sector (the twin deﬁ  cits in the 
United States). If market participants start to 
question the sustainability of the associated 
economic outcome, an overshooting can happen 
and a disorderly unwinding of global economic 
imbalances is possible.
The framework offered in this paper to assess 
global imbalances is not meant as a stand-
alone assessment. Instead, it may be useful 
as a conceptual benchmark for economists 
monitoring trends and developments in global 
imbalances. By way of illustration, applying the 
framework to 2007, one may note that global 
imbalances have been driven mainly by changes 
in cyclical factors. In the ﬁ  rst half of the year, 
real economy developments - a rotation of 
global demand - helped to bring about a broad 
stabilisation of imbalances, especially in the 
United States. During the summer of 2007, 
ﬁ   nancial market developments - a global 
repricing of risk - were a clear manifestation 
of existing imbalances and could signal the 
start of a more pronounced adjustment process. 
However, with structural drivers remaining 
largely in place, in particular the attractiveness 
of US ﬁ  nancial assets as a safe haven, a rapid 
adjustment in external imbalances remained, as 
of autumn 2007, relatively unlikely.46
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